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EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
Domestic violence is a major social problem throughout Arizona, and a major
daily challenge for law enforcement officers. Every day in Arizona, domestic
violence injures victims, damages property, destroys families, breeds further
crime and anti-social behavior, and perpetuates itself in younger generations.
Like most states, Arizona has “criminalized” domestic violence (DV) by
adopting laws and policies that bolster law enforcement officers’ arrest powers
and require them to arrest suspects under certain circumstances. Most
Arizona officers recognize the seriousness of domestic violence, and agree
that it is best handled by police intervention — having largely shed past
“traditional” attitudes that discounted the importance of family violence.
However, these street-level police officers and sheriff’s deputies also have a
discouraging tale to tell: In candid comments from across the state, they
report that they are skeptical of the ability of Arizona’s “pro-arrest” policy to
reduce domestic violence, frustrated by a perceived lack of follow-up from
prosecutors, and often at odds with victims whose predicaments they may
not fully understand.
Statewide Results
Layers of Meaning: Domestic Violence and Law Enforcement Attitudes in
Arizona solicited the views of active-duty officers throughout Arizona; a total
of 777 patrol-level officers and other ranks completed confidential two-page
questionnaires; in addition, 31 individual hour-long interviews were
conducted with detectives, supervisors, and other domestic violence experts
throughout the state. Results of a literature review and input from a variety of
domestic violence advocates, law enforcement professionals, and criminal
justice scholars were used to develop the interview questions and the survey.
The study’s major findings include:
? Officers Consider Domestic Violence a Major Problem — The vast
majority of Arizona officers consider domestic violence to be a serious,
underreported problem that generates other crime and violence and
contributes to a variety of costly issues for employers, policy makers,
and residents. In the survey, 80% of officers agreed that “Domestic
violence is a significant problem in the community I serve.”
Layers of Meaning:
Domestic Violence and Law Enforcement Attitudes in Arizona
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? Officers View Domestic Violence as a “Real Crime” — Nearly all
officers accept the view of domestic violence as a “real crime” that
warrants police intervention. Only 6% of officers agreed that “DV is best
handled as a private matter, rather than by the police.”
? Officers Consider Arrest Alone of Limited Value in Reducing Domestic
Violence — Across the state, officers show mixed support for Arizona’s
“pro-arrest” policy as being effective in reducing domestic violence.
There is not a consensus among officers that arresting batterers is an
effective deterrent in most cases. In the survey, 58% agreed that
“Arresting someone at a DV call seldom helps reduce future DV
incidents.”
? Officers Often Struggle to Understand Victims’ Actions and
Attitudes.— Many officers hold ambivalent views about domestic
violence victims’ actions and attitudes, sympathizing with their plight
yet questioning their behavior and outlooks. Many officers may not
completely understand the challenges victims face. Fully 72% of
officers agreed that “Many DV victims could easily leave their
relationships, but don’t,” and only 20% agreed that “Most DV victims
are receptive to interventions by law enforcement.”
? Officers Feel Too Few Cases Are Prosecuted — Officers recognize the
burdens faced by overworked prosecutors, yet voice frustration with
what they perceive to be a lack of follow-up by prosecutors. Officers feel
that this lessens the impact of arrest, discourages victims, emboldens
batterers, and spreads cynicism among officers themselves. Only 14%
agreed that “In my experience, prosecutors usually follow up effectively
on DV arrests.”
? Officers Want More Discretion in DV Cases — Most officers want more
discretion and fewer guidelines from supervisors about how to handle
domestic violence calls. Only 2% agreed “I need stricter guidelines from
supervisors on how to deal with DV calls;” 48% agreed with “I need
more freedom in deciding how to handle situations at DV calls.”
? Officers are split over whether more training is needed. Approximately a
third (35%) agreed that “More training would help me sort out what
happens at DV scenes.”
Good News and a Wake Up Call
These findings suggest that the years of effort to promote recognition of
domestic violence as a serious criminal matter have paid off. At the same
time, however, officers’ frustration seems to reflect a criminal justice system
caught in a downward spiral of expectation, action, and outcome. Based on
their experience with uncooperative victims and overburdened prosecutors,
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many officers end up resigned to the conclusion that intervening at a
domestic violence scene will at best protect the victim for that one night.
Over time, this pessimism may further erode officers’ appreciation of victims’
needs, rendering officers less sympathetic and less meticulous in gathering
the evidence necessary for effective prosecution. As a result, prosecutors
reject cases they say are ill-prepared; victims lose faith in the system, and
some stop calling 911.
Based on this study, officers take domestic violence seriously, and want to
do their part. But they also feel caught between a number of conflicting
forces and isolated in their efforts. As a result, they fear they may not be
doing their best to ensure victim safety and offender accountability.
Next Steps Suggested by This Research
Layers of Meaning’s findings — based on the experience of officers and their
supervisors — suggest some vital next steps in Arizona’s efforts to reduce
and prevent domestic violence.
• Promote Domestic Violence Training for Officers.
• Strengthen Community Efforts to Prevent Domestic Violence.
• Strengthen Arizona’s Criminal Justice Response to Domestic Violence.
• Map Key Domestic Violence Decision Points.
• Review How Prosecution Functions as Part of the Overall System.
Some 20 years since Arizona introduced a “pro-arrest” policy, it is a given
that domestic violence is a serious crime demanding police intervention.
Arizona’s police officers and sheriff’s deputies form the state’s front line in
responding to and reducing domestic violence. But it is an assignment
impossible to do alone. Community institutions, criminal justice institutions,
residents, and policy makers have important parts to play. All Arizonans can
help to ensure that “first responder” does not mean “only responder.”
“Preventing domestic
violence is prevention
of crime, all the
way around.”
– Female Region 4 detective
“[Domestic violence]
invades a life, and we’re
finding that it’s so much
more far-reaching than
just the domestic
violence act itself.
It’s a life.”
— Female Region 2 detective
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Layers of Meaning:
Domestic Violence and Law Enforcement Attitudes in Arizona
Domestic violence is a major social problem throughout Arizona, and a major
daily challenge for law enforcement officers. In Phoenix, for example, it ranked
as the second most common call to police in 2004. Unfortunately, every day in
Arizona, domestic violence injures victims, damages property, destroys
families, breeds further crime and anti-social behavior, and perpetuates itself
in younger generations. Like most states, Arizona has “criminalized” domestic
violence (DV) by adopting laws and policies that bolster law enforcement
officers’ arrest powers and require them to arrest suspects under certain
circumstances. Most Arizona officers recognize the seriousness of domestic
violence and agree that it is best handled by police intervention — having
largely shed past “traditional” attitudes that discounted the importance of
family violence. However, these street-level police officers and sheriff’s
deputies also have a discouraging tale to tell. In candid comments from across
Arizona, they report that they are skeptical of the value of Arizona’s pro-arrest
policy, deeply frustrated by what they consider to be a lack of follow-up from
prosecutors, and often at odds with victims whom they sometimes perceive as
ungrateful and unreliable. It is difficult to imagine a more troubling message
from a more authoritative source.
The on-scene officer is often the first (and perhaps only) justice system
representative encountered by a victim; as such, the officer functions as a
gatekeeper to the system’s services and requirements. At the same time,
officers are required to:
• operate within a comprehensive set of definitive guidelines
• gather and record sufficient evidence at the scene to enable
prosecution even without victim cooperation
• serve as de facto counselors for traumatized victims and their families
For these reasons, it is important to examine how officers feel about
domestic violence, what they consider to be their appropriate roles in
responding to incidents, how well they think current policies fit with the
situations they encounter on the job, and how they believe policies and
practices could be improved. These are issues about which differing and
sometimes sharply clashing views are held by researchers, law enforcement
officials, prosecutors, domestic violence advocates, victims, victims’ rights
advocates, and others. It is important to note that this study does not
champion any particular view or presume to identify any “right” answers.
Instead, it seeks to report and analyze the experiences and opinions of a key
2 Morrison Institute for Public Policy
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constituency — police officers and deputies with frontline or supervisory
responsibility for domestic violence law enforcement — as a contribution to
the ongoing policy debate about how to reduce and prevent domestic
violence.
This project was commissioned by the Governor’s Commission to Prevent
Violence Against Women, the Arizona Department of Public Safety, and the
Arizona Peace Officer Standards and Training Board (AZPOST) to gather
insights on potential improvements in training and policies.
Police and Domestic Violence Issues
The National Picture
The past 30 years have witnessed dramatic changes in American society’s
official attitudes towards domestic violence, and in the expectations placed
upon the law enforcement officials who deal with it (see: Carlson, Worden
et.al. 2000; Hirschel and Dawson 2000; Robinson 2000; Miller 2001). Long
considered a private family matter, since the 1970s domestic violence has
been seen as a crime. Police officers — historically trained to consider
domestic violence a “disturbance call” that necessitated merely the
restoration of order — were now instructed to approach such calls as criminal
Pre-Policy Change Post-Policy Change
Domestic violence is a family matter. Domestic violence is a crime.
Domestic violence is best handled by the parties themselves or by
social service agencies.
Police agencies have a responsibility to handle domestic violence
calls.
Domestic violence calls do not constitute “real” police work. Police work includes fighting domestic violence in the community.
Mediation/separation are the preferred police methods for handling
domestic violence calls.
Mediation/separation are not appropriate police responses to
domestic violence.
Making arrests in cases of domestic violence is a waste of an
officer’s time.
Making arrests in cases of domestic violence is part of an officer’s
police duty.
Arrest is to be used only as a last resort in cases of domestic
violence.
Arrest is the preferred police response in cases of domestic violence.
Arrest will increase the likelihood of future violence occurring. Arrest will decrease the likelihood of future violence occurring.
Victims are untrustworthy and probably did something to instigate or
deserve the abuse.
Statements made by victims provide sufficient probable cause for
arrest.
If the victim is intoxicated, uncooperative, or probably won’t
prosecute his or her case, then an arrest should not be made.
When probable cause exists, arrest should always be made,
regardless of the victim’s characteristics or disposition.
Source: A. L. Robinson, “The Effect of a Domestic Policy Change on Police Officers’ Schemata,” Criminal Justice Behavior, 2000.
Table 1: Domestic Violence Has Been Criminalized by Policy Changes
Summary of Changes in Police Agency Approaches to Domestic Violence Over Time
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matters that required formal enforcement of the law. Since the 1980s, more
and more state statutes and agency policies have directed that this
enforcement include an on-scene misdemeanor arrest without a warrant. In
1984, for example, the U.S. Attorney General’s Task Force on Family Violence
recommended that, “family violence should be recognized and responded to
as a criminal activity,” and law enforcement agencies should, “establish
arrest as the preferred response in cases of family violence.” In 1994, the
federal Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) further promoted legal
interventions in cases of domestic violence, explicitly encouraging state and
local governments, “to treat domestic violence as a serious violation of
criminal law,” and providing federal grants to, among other things,
“implement mandatory arrest or pro-arrest programs and policies in police
departments” (Glazer, Glock et al. 1997).
The reasons behind this fundamental change include: 1) the women’s
movement, which called attention to the prevalence of domestic violence,
the inadequacy of law enforcement responses, and the plight of battered
women; 2) decisions by more domestic violence victims to sue police
agencies for failing to provide equal protection under the law; 3) the impact
of research in the 1980s that suggested that arrest of suspected offenders
would better deter them from further battering; 4) the national move towards
more punitive measures in dealing with social problems such as child abuse
and child support.
A great deal of research in the 1980s and 1990s studied the effectiveness
of arrest, as opposed to mediation, as a deterrent to more domestic violence.
The most influential efforts were known as the National Institute of Justice’s
(NIJ) Spouse Assault Replication Program (SARP). The nationwide effort
included field experiments by six police departments and research teams
between 1981 and 1991. The first of these, in Minneapolis, found that
arresting batterers reduced the rate of subsequent offenses against the
same victim by half in a six-month period (Sherman and Berk 1984). Hailed
as proof of the value of pro-arrest policies, the widely published findings
influenced many agencies — as well as the U.S. Attorney General’s task force
noted above — to adopt pro-arrest policies.
However, later replications of the Minneapolis experiment in other cities
found inconsistent effects of arrest on subsequent intimate partner violence.
In most cases, arrest was found to be no more effective as a deterrent than
other interventions, such as mediation and counseling (Miller 2001).
Researchers also urged caution in generalizing from one place to another
because of the varying models and measures used across the sites. By
1998, in fact, the National Academy of Sciences report, Violence in Families,
concluded that, “arrest in all misdemeanor cases will not on average
“Long considered a
private family matter,
since the 1970s domestic
violence has been seen
as a crime.”
4 Morrison Institute for Public Policy
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produce a discernable effect on recidivism” (National Academy of Science
1998). Still further analysis of the SARP results in 2001 by NIJ and the
Centers for Disease Control found, “good evidence of a consistent and direct,
though modest, deterrent effect of arrest on aggression by males against
their female intimate partners.” (Maxwell, Graner et al. 2001). Deterrence is
an important goal of pro-arrest policies, but not the only one. Providing “just
desserts” to offenders, and demonstrating to children and other witnesses
that domestic violence is indeed a serious crime with serious consequences
for offenders, are also common goals (Maxwell, Graner et al. 2001).
The efficacy of arrest remains a topic of some debate. As Angela M. Moore
Parmley, acting chief of the Violence and Victimization Research Division of
the National Institute of Justice, wrote:
Sadly, with all the money that has been invested in criminal justice
to control violence against women, we know very little about the
impact of these investments… We have no evidence to date that
VAWA has led to a decrease in the overall levels of violence
against women (Parmley 2004).
But it is safe to say that domestic violence has been criminalized in the
United States in law, policy, and public opinion. As a result, research has
shifted to examining how such laws and policies are being carried out,
including whether:
• Police are arresting the right people. Susan Miller, author of The
Paradox of Women Arrested for Domestic Violence (Miller 2001), and
others warn that pro-arrest policies have driven up the frequency of
“dual arrests” — in which the batterer and the supposed victim are both
arrested — even though little evidence supports an increase in women’s
culpability.
• Police are arresting enough people. NIJ reports have questioned why
the rates of arrest of domestic violence suspects have not increased
more than they have, given the prevalence of pro-arrest policies and the
persistent ranking of domestic violence as among agencies’ most
frequent violence calls.
• Suspects arrested for and even convicted of domestic violence are
being held accountable. Experts and advocates alike have noted
inconsistencies in follow-up from prosecutors and decisions by judges.
Thus, questions remain about how thoroughly police agencies have
embraced the sweeping changes in domestic violence policy and
implemented them in their everyday actions. For example, research such as
the NIJ report, Violence Against Women: Synthesis of Research for Law
Layers of Meaning:
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Enforcement Officials (Hirschel and Dawson 2000), indicates that some
agencies have been slow to fully implement pro-arrest policies, and that
some officers remain reluctant to accept criminalization, due in part to
personal attitudes concerning women and domestic violence, officers’
negative perception of the utility of police involvement in domestic violence
cases, and their skepticism about follow-up from prosecutors and judges
(Hirschel and Dawson 2000).
The Situation in Arizona
Domestic violence research in Arizona has tended to parallel national studies
and findings. For example, Kathleen Ferraro at Northern Arizona University
observed Phoenix police officers shortly after the start
of the department’s presumptive arrest policy in 1984
and found that many officers ignored the policy and
failed to make arrests, due to what Ferraro termed legal,
ideological, practical, and political factors (Ferraro
1989). In 1999, a telephone survey of Maricopa County
women found a majority citing domestic violence as the
most pressing of five issues “facing women in Arizona;”
about one-third of respondents reported having
witnessed abuse or experienced it at some time in their
lives, and 16% acknowledged that they currently were in
an abusive relationship (Wirthlin Worldwide 1999). Of
those in abusive relationships, most said they had no
plans to leave, due primarily to finances, beliefs they
could fix the relationship, and concerns about their
children. Also in 1999, the National Council on Crime
and Delinquency examined Arizona law enforcement
policies, practices, attitudes, and training on violence
against women (National Council on Crime and
Delinquency and Mesa Community College 1999). The
findings most relevant to this study from focus groups
with 35 officers from five agencies showed:
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While some [officers] see a rise in the number of [domes-
ticviolence] calls, they do not equate this with a rise in 
theviolence. Repeat calls are an issue for some, but, they 
alsorecognize that not being called back to an earlier scene 
doesnot mean that the violence has ended. Few know of 
‘successstories’… All feel that their impact is limited when 
victims donot cooperate… Most importantly, throughout the 
[focusgroup] sessions, they spoke to the need for coordi-
nationbetween agencies (National Council on Crime and 
Delinquency and Mesa Community College 1999: 80).
While some [officers] see a rise in the number 
of [domestic violence] calls, they do not equate 
this with a rise in the violence. Repeat calls are an
issue for some, but, they also recognize that not 
being called back to an earlier scene does not mean 
that the violence has ended. Few know of ‘success 
stories’… All feel that their impact is limited when 
victims do not cooperate… Most importantly, 
throughout the [focus group] sessions, they spoke 
to the need for coordination between agencies 
(National Council on Crime and Delinquency and 
Mesa Community College 1999: 80).
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A Knowledge Gap About Officers
However, in Arizona and elsewhere more research has focused on the
incidence of domestic violence, the efficacy of arrest, and the experiences of
victims, than on the attitudes and perceptions of law enforcement officers.
Indeed, even fewer studies have sought to record officers’ opinions in their
own words (Johnson 2004). Those projects that have reported police
attitudes and opinions have been limited by small study populations, making
it difficult to draw broad conclusions. This lack of input from officers
constitutes a significant research deficit, given that: 1) Changes in domestic
violence laws and policies have been dramatic and widespread; 2) The
changes have been codified in law and policy in a relatively short time;
3) The changes reduce discretion typically valued by police officers; and
4) The pro-arrest movement has forced significant change upon police
agencies, which can be resistant to change.
National researchers have noted this knowledge gap. For example, Peter G.
Sinden and B. Joyce Stephens wrote in 1999 that, “… absent from the
literature are studies which analyze police descriptions of their perceptions of
domestic violence events which have been obtained through extensive
interviews with officers” (Sinden and Stephens 1999: 313). In 2004, Johnson
reported in The Police Journal that the situation remained the same:
The police officer’s voice on these matters has generally been
absent from the literature, which has focused primarily on
observational studies and official data. The literature is filled with
the reasoned assumptions of researchers and observers, but little
understand how actual police officers perceive their job and its
and their ability to respond effectively to incidents of domestic
violence (Johnson 2004: 217).
This study addresses these research deficits by directly soliciting the views of
a large number of active-duty officers, male and female, in urban and rural
areas of Arizona and, whenever possible, using their exact words and
comments. The majority of participants in the research for Layers of
Meaning: Domestic Violence and Law Enforcement Attitudes in Arizona were
police officers and sheriff’s deputies who respond to domestic violence calls.
A few patrol supervisors (mostly sergeants) also took part because of their
frequent role as advisors to officers at domestic violence scenes and their
general role as trainers and conduits of formal and informal agency policies.
A total of 777 officers completed anonymous two-page questionnaires
containing 32 close-ended items, two open-ended items requesting general
comments, and demographic questions (see survey in Appendix). In addition,
31 individual hour-long interviews were conducted. Surveys and interviews
“This study addresses
these research deficits
by directly soliciting the
views of a large number
of active-duty officers,
male and female, in
urban and rural areas of
Arizona and, whenever
possible, using their
exact words and
comments.”
difficulties in order that we can find ways of improving their lives
direct input from the officers themselves. It is essential that we
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were done in five regions as shown in Figure 1. See Appendix for more details
of participation.
Domestic Violence in Arizona Law
The domestic violence arrest laws that exist today in nearly all states are
variously referred to as “mandatory arrest” laws, pro-arrest laws, or
“presumptive arrest” laws. The Arizona Legislature created the state’s first
domestic violence laws in 1980, which have been amended many times
since. The key change from the past is that, under certain circumstances,
officers are required to make an arrest even if their own judgment at the
scene directs otherwise and even if the victim does not desire it. This is the
case in Arizona. For most domestic violence-designated crimes — such as
disorderly conduct or criminal damage — ARS 13-3601 holds that an officer
with probable cause “may” make a misdemeanor or felony arrest, with or
without a warrant, and with or without having witnessed the crime. However,
in a case of, “infliction of physical injury or involving the discharge, use or
threatening exhibition of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument,” an
Arizona peace officer “must” make an arrest. This provision does contains a
caveat, allowing the officer to forego arrest if he or she, “has reasonable
grounds to believe that the circumstances at the time are such that the
victim will be protected from further injury.”
How these statutes are put into practice varies somewhat across Arizona law
enforcement agencies, depending on such factors as resource and workload
pressures and legal interpretations by police executives and legal advisors
and by prosecutors; this is true, for example, concerning officers’ readiness
to make arrests for lesser offenses such as trespass, criminal damage, and
disorderly conduct. However, all agencies contacted in this study reported
that they follow pro-arrest provisions concerning at least assaults and
weapon displays. Most agencies also said that officers are instructed to err
on the side of arrest when in doubt.
How Police in Arizona Become
Involved in Domestic Violence Cases
While specific response procedures vary across agencies, law enforcement
intervention at domestic violence scenes usually starts with a 911 call. The
call typically comes from the victim, a family member, or a neighbor.
The call is answered by an agency dispatcher, who plays a key role by
determining the seriousness of the call and assigning it an appropriate
priority. Calls reporting a crime in progress receive the highest priority, while
those describing an assault or other crime that’s already occurred and/or
whose perpetrator has left are treated less urgently. Given their perception of
• 1 •
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the dangerousness of domestic violence calls, most agencies prefer to have
at least two officers respond to the scene, and may have the first arriving
officer wait for backup before proceeding. After surveying the scene and
interviewing participants, officers who conclude that the legal standard of
“probable cause” for arrest has been met may or must (see above) arrest the
suspect and immediately take him or her to jail.
Officers are usually expected to comfort the victim, arrange for medical
assistance if necessary, provide victim’s rights information and alert the
victim to other services such as emergency shelters and family advocacy
centers. Some agencies have victims’ advocates or counselors available to
respond to the scene. If officers do not find enough evidence to constitute
“probable cause,” they will not make an arrest, but may still write a report on
the incident for review by detectives and, perhaps, prosecutors. They might
also urge the parties to separate. If a suspect flees before officers arrive — a
common occurrence — the officers will send a report on the incident to the
detective bureau, if the agency has one, or make efforts themselves to locate
the suspect in coming days, as time permits.
Calls, Arrests, and Convictions
for Domestic Violence in Arizona
Estimates show approximately 110,000 domestic violence calls for service to
police each year in Arizona,1 and about 24,000 domestic violence arrests
each year. The Phoenix Police Department may account for half of the calls.
For January 2000-August 2005, the Phoenix PD reported a total of 306,206
DV calls for service, an average annual rate of 54,036.2 Seventy percent of
arrests for domestic violence are in Maricopa and Pima counties because of
the presence of major urban areas, Greater Phoenix and Tucson (Table 2).
Table 3 shows domestic violence convictions during the same period. The
results are similar to the distribution of arrests, except for Mohave, La Paz,
and Yuma counties. This area (Region 4) accounts for a relatively high
percentage of the state’s convictions for domestic violence (21.1%)
compared to its percentage of arrests (11.4%).
1. There is no state-wide collection of domestic violence calls to police; this estimate comes
from a 2002 survey of most of Arizona’s police agencies, conducted by the Governor’s
Commission to Prevent Violence Against Women. The number represents all calls. Numerous
calls to 911 or police may relate to one incident.
2. Top 25 Dispatched/Callback Calls for Service for the City of Phoenix 1/1/00-8/31/05,
Phoenix Police Department, Crime Analysis and Research Unit.
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Table 3: Patterns for Domestic Violence Convictions
Generally Follow Arrest Patterns
Domestic Violence Convictions by Study Region and
County, Arizona 2003-August 2005
Study Region 
and Counties 2003 2004
2005 Thru
AUG
Total % of DV
Convictions in Arizona
(2003-AUG 2005)
Region 1
Maricopa 3,835 4,147 1,763 46.5%
Region 2
Pima 1,823 1,049 301 15.1%
Region 3
Coconino 261 238 89 2.8%
Yavapai 353 241 118 3.4%
subtotal: 614 479 207 6.2%
Region 4
La Paz 42 29 7 0.4%
Mohave 785 832 326 9.3%
Yuma 951 927 520 11.4%
subtotal: 1,778 1,788 853 21.1%
Region 5
Apache 51 45 16 0.5%
Cochise 207 227 150 2.8%
Gila 132 104 65 1.4%
Graham 66 65 26 0.7%
Greenlee 12 14 2 0.1%
Navajo 132 35 8 0.8%
Pinal 425 358 134 4.4%
Santa Cruz 25 7 2 0.2%
subtotal: 1,050 855 413 11.1%
Arizona Other 1
Total: 9,101 8,318 3,537 100.0%
Source: Arizona Department of Public Safety.
Table 2: The Largest Counties Have the
Most Domestic Violence Arrests
Domestic Violence Arrests in Arizona by
Study Region and County, 2003-August 2005
Study Region 
and Counties 2003 2004
JAN -AUG
2005
Total % of DV
Arrests in Arizona
(2003-AUG 2005)
Region 1
Maricopa 10,640 11,091 8,272 46.3%
Region 2
Pima 5,870 5,493 3,789 23.4%
Region 3
Coconino 754 832 581 3.3%
Yavapai 833 706 564 3.2%
subtotal: 1,587 1,538 1,145 6.5%
Region 4
La Paz 111 104 38 0.4%
Mohave 1,449 1,540 883 6.0%
Yuma 1,212 1,255 806 5.1%
subtotal: 2,772 2,899 1,727 11.5%
Region 5
Apache 74 68 54 0.3%
Cochise 681 723 539 3.0%
Gila 421 443 308 1.8%
Graham 123 111 62 0.5%
Greenlee 36 42 42 0.2%
Navajo 365 267 175 1.2%
Pinal 1,161 965 560 4.1%
Santa Cruz 204 166 143 0.8%
subtotal: 3,065 2,785 1,883 11.9%
Arizona Other 88 84 64 0.4%
Total: 24,022 23,890 16,880 100.0%
Source: Arizona Department of Public Safety.
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Characteristics of Survey and
Interview Respondents
Survey Respondents
Completed surveys were collected from 777 police officers serving in 24
town or city police departments and seven sheriff’s offices throughout the
state. The agencies are not listed, in order to preserve the confidentiality of
the respondents.
Sixty-six percent of those surveyed work in the counties containing the major
metropolitan areas of Phoenix and Tucson, with the remaining 34% in non-
metro, predominately rural counties. In the data presented below a
distinction is made between “major urban” and other police agencies,
excluding the Maricopa and Pima County Sheriff’s offices, which in part
serve rural areas of their counties.
Survey respondents ranged in age from 21 to 59, with an
average age of 33.9 years. They had worked in law
enforcement for periods from a few months to 37 years, with
an average length of service of 8.5 years. According to data
from Arizona Peace Officer Standards and Training Board
(AZPOST), frontline officers from all of the city and county
police departments and sheriff’s offices in the state
averaged 36 years of age and had an average service time of
8.5 years.3 Survey respondents included line (patrol-level)
officers (82%), sergeants (12%), with “other” (6%)
comprising ranks that included lieutenants, corporals, and
field training officers. Respondents were primarily male
(89%), reflecting the composition of city and town police
departments and sheriff’s offices in Arizona. AZPOST reports
88% of Arizona line officers are male. Nearly three-quarters
of respondents were non-Hispanic white, with the remaining
quarter comprised of other racial and ethnic groups, mainly Hispanics. In this
report, findings are analyzed by white and non-white categories. AZPOST does
not provide racial and ethnic data on Arizona police officers.
All respondents had some experience responding to domestic violence calls,
except for one officer who had recently joined law enforcement, although this
person had received police academy training. Respondents were asked to
estimate the number of domestic violence calls they had been to in the last
3. Average age and service time were computed from the AZPOST database of sworn officers
that included agency, gender, date of birth, and hire date.
Table 4: Officers from Throughout Arizona
Provided Data for the Study
Distribution of Survey Responses by Study Region
Regions Number Percent
1 Central (Maricopa) 409 52.6%
2 Southern (Pima) 104 13.4%
3 Northern (Coconino/Yavapai) 100 12.9%
4 Western (La Paz/Mohave/Yuma) 73 9.4%
5 Eastern (Apache/Cochise/ Gila/Graham/ 
    Greenlee/Navajo/Pinal/Santa Cruz)
91 11.7%
Total: 777 100.0%
Source: Morrison Institute for Public Policy, Arizona State University, 2005.
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year. Responses ranged widely from 0 to (a highly unlikely)
3,000 with an average of 115.5. Table 5 shows the self-
reported average4 number of calls responded to in the last year
by selected characteristics.
On average, female officers reported responding to a much
higher number of domestic violence calls than males, and line
officers responded to more calls than either sergeants or other
ranks. Calls varied by region, with officers in major urban areas
reporting a much higher number of responses than those in
non-urban areas.
Respondents were asked to indicate how long ago their last
training was on domestic violence and how many domestic
violence trainings they had ever attended in Arizona.
Respondents reported a range from 0 months (never trained, or
trained only at the mandatory police academy, and not since) to
23 years since their last domestic violence training, with an
average of just over two years. Similarly, respondents reported a
broad range of domestic violence trainings attended, from 0 to
200 with an average of 3.6. The number of trainings attended
are grouped into three roughly equal categories: Low (0 or 1),
Medium (2 or 3), and High (4 or more).
Characteristics of Interviewees
Of the 31 interviews 20 were with men and 11 with women. Table
6 shows their distribution by study region.
The confidential interviews were conducted with detectives
specializing in domestic violence (11), sergeants (5), lieutenants (4),
shelter staff (4), prosecutors (2), and a chief of police, a deputy chief
of police, an assistant chief of police, a sheriff’s office captain, and
a lead patrol officer. When extracts from interviews are used,
individuals are identified only in general terms to safeguard
anonymity. In this report only survey findings and interview excerpts
from police officers are included, although comments and opinions
from several prosecutors and domestic violence shelter staff have
informed the interpretation of findings. Comments from supervisor
interview are shown in what follows in italics. Written comments
from survey respondents are shown in regular type.
4. Table 6 excludes self-reported estimates of calls responded to that were too high to be likely,
i.e., 1,000 or more. These results are known as “trimmed averages.”
Table 5: Calls Vary Widely Across Arizona
Average Number of Domestic Violence Calls
Responded to by Selected Variables
Characteristics Average Number
Of Calls
Male 84.5
Female 117.3
Officer 96.4
Sergeant 54.2
Other 56.2
1 Central (Maricopa) 105.8
2 Southern (Pima) 96.7
3 Northern (Coconino/Yavapai) 70.7
4 Western (La Paz/Mohave/Yuma) 67.8
5 Eastern (Apache/Cochise/ Gila/Graham/ 
    Greenlee/Navajo/Pinal/Santa Cruz)
41.3
Major Urban Areas 103.4
Non-urban Areas 58.9
Source: Morrison Institute for Public Policy, Arizona State University,
2005.
Table 6: Interviews Were Done Throughout Arizona
Distribution of Interviews by Study Region
Study Regions
Number of
Interviews
1 Central (Maricopa) 9
2 Southern (Pima) 9
3 Northern (Coconino/Yavapai) 3
4 Western (La Paz/Mohave/Yuma) 6
5 Eastern (Apache/Cochise/ Gila/Graham/ 
    Greenlee/Navajo/Pinal/Santa Cruz)
4
Total: 31
Source: Morrison Institute for Public Policy, Arizona State
University, 2005.
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Domestic Violence:
Highlights from History
1972: One of the country’s first battered women’s shelters,
Rainbow Retreat, opens in Phoenix.
1978: The National Coalition Against Domestic Violence
(NCADV) created.
1980: Arizona legislature passes first domestic violence bill.
Arizona Coalition Against Domestic Violence is founded.
1984: Publication of the Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment
generates national momentum in favor of arresting
offenders.
1984: The U.S. Attorney General’s Task Force on Family
Violence recommends that family violence be treated as a
crime and that law enforcement agencies should make
arrests in such cases. Congress passes the Family Violence
Prevention and Services Act (FVPSA). Phoenix Police
Department adopts policy stating officers should arrest
offenders even if victims object to prosecution, and when
probable cause exists that officers should arrest even if a
misdemeanor offense did not occur in their presence.
1985: Surgeon General identifies domestic violence as a major
public health concern.
1994: Congress passes the Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA) into law.
1995: Office of Violence Against Women created within the
U.S. Department of Justice.
1997: Arizona Legislature creates the Domestic Violence
Shelter Fund, a dedicated fund source for shelter services in
the state.
2000: Congress reauthorizes the Violence Against Women Act,
adding the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000.
2004: Governor’s Commission to Prevent Violence Against
Women releases The State Plan on Domestic and Sexual Violence:
A Guide for Safety and Justice.
2005: Arizona Legislature eliminates law providing lesser
penalties for sexual assault of a spouse than for sexual assault
of a stranger.
Sources: Ferraro 1989; Governor’s Commission to Prevent Violence Against Women
2004.
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Characteristics of the Data
Morrison Institute for Public Policy’s interest in and research on domestic
violence started with Hitting Home: Voices of Domestic Violence. This
publication told stories of victims and others involved in the issue. Layers of
Meaning: Domestic Violence and Law Enforcement Attitudes in Arizona
follows up with the voices of law enforcement officers and an in-depth,
statewide exploration of their outlooks.
The results presented here probably form the most comprehensive dataset
collected on the issue of police attitudes to domestic violence in Arizona
because of: 1) the size and scope of the data collected; and 2) the use of
both quantitative and qualitative sources.
Taking a cue from criticisms of the existing literature on police attitudes to
domestic violence, the study was designed to hear directly from officers from
all parts of the state, from the largest police departments to some of the
smallest. The result is a rich dataset which is representative of frontline
police officers statewide by gender, geography, years in law enforcement, and
age. This information expresses the depth and diversity of police opinion in
Arizona.
With input from the study’s clients, other local experts in domestic violence
issues, and the extensive literature, survey responses were gathered across
a wide range of domestic violence topics, including attitudes toward
domestic violence arrests, attitudes toward victims and offenders, police role
in domestic violence incidents, views about what causes domestic violence,
and opinions about response by the criminal justice system as a whole (see
Appendix for survey instrument).
The completed surveys included background and demographic information
about the respondents’ gender, ethnicity, age, years in law enforcement,
experience of domestic violence calls, and attendance at domestic violence
trainings. It also included an open-ended question on what would help
officers in dealing with domestic violence and included a space for other
comments. All comments were coded using the same scheme used to code
the 31 transcribed interviews. The result was a dataset comprising 777
observations across almost 100 variables, 31 fully transcribed interviews,
and 600 written survey comments, comprising almost 1,000 pages coded
across nearly 100 topics (see Appendix for methodology).
Findings
“Preventing domestic
violence is prevention of
crime, all the way
around.”
– Female Region 4 detective
“[Domestic violence]
invades a life, and we’re
finding that it’s so much
more far-reaching than
just the domestic
violence act itself. It’s a
life.”
— Female Region 2 detective
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Survey Responses
Respondents were asked to indicate their agreement with statements about
domestic violence on a 5-point scale from “strongly agree” to “strongly
disagree.” For the sake of exposition, in the summary table (Table 7) and in
most graphics throughout, the category “strongly agree” and “agree” are
combined into a single “agree” category and “strongly disagree” and
“disagree” are combined into a single “disagree” category. In selected cases,
the full 5-point scale results are shown. The “neither agree nor disagree”
category is open to a number of interpretations: respondents may have
meant they had no opinion, they didn’t know, or that they were undecided. In
several instances respondents wrote next to this option, phrases such as
“Every case different” or “Depends,” indicating it was sometimes difficult to
come to a general view.
Results of the full 5-point scale for each statement are provided in the
Appendix (and in selected results reported below); it should be noted that the
full results were used as the basis for statistical tests of significance among
a series of demographic and other variables (see Appendix for details). Table
7 shows respondents’ overall level of agreement for each of the 32
statements in the order they occurred in the survey. The Layers of Meaning
findings that follow are grouped under six major themes:
• Officers Consider Domestic Violence a Major Problem
• Officers View Domestic Violence as a “Real Crime”
• Officers Consider Arrest Alone of Limited Value in Reducing
Domestic Violence
• Officers Often Struggle to Understand Victims’ Actions and
Attitudes
• Officers Feel Too Few Cases Are Prosecuted
• Officers Want More Discretion in DV Cases
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Table 7:Diverse Views Are Held by Officers Across a Wide Range of Domestic Violence Issues
Summary of Survey Responses by Three-point Scale
Survey Statement Agree
Neither Agree 
Nor Disagree Disagree
I am more likely to be injured during a DV call than in a violence call involving strangers. 68.7% 26.6% 4.8%
Too many DV calls are for only verbal family arguments. 66.7% 22.3% 11.0%
I need more freedom in deciding how to handle situations at DV calls. 48.4% 30.0% 21.6%
It's often best to arrest both parties in DV calls. 11.6% 34.5% 53.9%
Substance abuse by the victim is a primary cause of DV. 32.2% 30.9% 37.0%
Arresting someone at a DV call seldom helps reduce future DV incidents. 58.1% 18.4% 23.5%
Police should arrest in DV cases only when there is clear evidence of injury. 41.6% 17.2% 41.2%
DV calls take too much of officers' time and effort. 29.7% 28.0% 42.3%
DV is best handled as a private matter, rather than by the police. 6.1% 16.3% 77.6%
In my experience, prosecutors usually follow up effectively on DV arrests. 14.4% 31.2% 54.4%
DV victims are often as responsible for the incident as the person arrested. 36.3% 35.1% 28.6%
It's often hard to know who to arrest in DV incidents. 26.6% 27.2% 46.2%
I am less likely to make a DV arrest if the suspect is cooperative at the scene. 6.9% 19.4% 73.7%
An arrest policy is the best approach to DV calls. 31.6% 31.8% 36.6%
Many DV victims could easily leave their relationships, but don't. 71.8% 14.6% 13.6%
Most DV incidents occur because of offenders' anger-control problems. 59.6% 27.7% 12.7%
A major problem with DV is that there are so many repeat cases. 87.3% 9.4% 3.2%
Substance abuse by the suspect is a primary cause of DV. 58.3% 30.2% 11.6%
Most DV calls are isolated events in otherwise good relationships. 6.5% 25.1% 68.4%
I need stricter guidelines from supervisors on how to deal with DV calls. 2.1% 17.1% 80.8%
I am more likely to make DV arrests when children are witnesses. 24.0% 42.3% 33.7%
There should be a limit on how many times I respond to DV calls from the same victim at the same address. 22.4% 17.9% 59.8%
I think DV offenders should be arrested even when victims don't want it. 71.9% 12.1% 16.0%
More training would help me sort out what happens at DV scenes. 35.4% 29.7% 34.9%
I find it's often hard to decide whether there is probable cause for arrest in DV cases. 11.9% 22.9% 65.2%
DV victims often exaggerate the amount of violence involved. 40.5% 34.5% 25.0%
Most DV incidents stem from abusers' need for power and control over victims. 55.3% 38.3% 6.5%
Mental health problems are a major contributor to DV incidents. 19.3% 52.1% 28.6%
Most DV victims are receptive to interventions by law enforcement. 19.9% 29.9% 50.3%
I am more likely to make an arrest if the victim is cooperative at the scene. 19.4% 38.2% 42.4%
Most victims are safer as soon as they leave an abusive relationship. 62.9% 21.0% 16.1%
DV is a significant problem in the community I serve. 80.4% 14.4% 5.2%
Source: Morrison Institute for Public Policy, Arizona State University, 2005.
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Officers Consider Domestic Violence a Major Problem
“High-volume” and “Resource Heavy” for Law Enforcement
Among the strongest and most consistent findings in the study is the
importance that Arizona officers place on domestic violence as a social
problem. A majority of Arizona officers, both line and supervisory, say they
consider domestic violence to be a serious issue in their communities,
requiring a substantial amount of agency resources.
Among survey respondents, 80.4% agreed that domestic violence, “is a
significant problem in the community I serve” (Figure 2). While a large
majority of respondents of both sexes agreed, women were more likely to
agree than men (91% compared to 79%).
Nationally, some researchers and advocates have faulted police agencies for
devoting insufficient attention and resources to domestic violence, due to
competition from felony crimes, resistance from officers who believe
domestic violence is primarily a private matter, or other reasons. While that
competition and those attitudes surely exist in Arizona, this survey shows
that most officers at least acknowledge the negative impact that domestic
violence is having on their communities.
Most of the supervisors interviewed cited domestic violence as their
agency’s most common call for service, or most frequent violence call. They
also described it as a resource-heavy task, because many agencies regularly
dispatch more than one officer to these scenes, and require on-scene
evidence gathering that can be time consuming. A male lieutenant in Region
1 commented, “I would say it’s probably number one [among his
community’s law enforcement problems]…Of 15 homicides last year, we were
able to find that eight of them were domestic violence related.” A male
sergeant in Region 1 said, “It’s a situation that we deal with every day.”
Similar responses came from supervisors in other regions. A male lieutenant
in Region 5, for example, said, “I’m going to say that if we’re responding to
some type of fight, probably 80% of the time it’s going to be a DV.” And a
male sergeant in Region 4 noted “It’s not unusual for just on a day shift to
have two or three [domestic violence calls] a day. And in the evening, people
are home and things happen.” Finally, as a male Region 2 detective put it:
“Right now, I think DV is probably the hotbed number one crime in this
country.”
The seriousness with which Arizona officers view domestic violence is similar
to that of metropolitan Phoenix residents. In May 2005, as a companion to this
study, a telephone survey was administered to 600 heads of households by
Behavior Research Center in Maricopa County to explore public attitudes
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toward domestic violence. Commissioned by Morrison Institute for Public Policy
and Maricopa Association of Governments, the survey found that a large
majority of residents (76%) have heard “a lot” or “some” about domestic
violence in Arizona and consider it a “major” problem (72%); that 40% report
that they or someone close to them has been a victim; and that the vast
majority (89%) support the notion that, “arresting offenders for domestic
violence is usually a good policy.” The public’s acceptance of police as
appropriate first responders is shown by the 78% who report they would call
911 if someone close to them was in a situation of, “aggressive behavior
between intimate partners that threatens or causes physical injury or property
damage.” In addition, 34% would call 911 if someone close to them was in a
situation of, “verbal, psychological, and/or financial abuse between intimate
partners through which one seeks domination and control over the other.”
Police Warn of the “Ripple Effect” of Domestic Violence
A point raised by many supervisors is the role of domestic violence in
generating more crime, violence, and other anti-social behavior. They said
that domestic violence is linked to child abuse, animal abuse, substance
abuse and other crimes within and outside the family. A female detective in
Region 4 said:
Because of all the issues within a family, [domestic violence incidents] can
generate all other kinds of crimes. If we address issues of domestic violence, we’re
going to compensate down the road [for] other violence crimes. You have people
that are in … prisons, they’re in jails, juvenile [detention], and often times
those [crimes] come back to … family issues ... Preventing domestic violence is
prevention of crime, all the way around.
A female detective in Region 2 described the collateral effects of domestic
violence that go beyond the criminal issues.
[Domestic violence] affects…a victim’s interaction in the rest of her life. She
might have to be absent from work a lot because of injuries or because she gets so
many harassing telephone calls at work [that] she has to leave. She gets fired;
she gets kicked out of her apartment. It invades a life, and we’re finding that it’s
so much more far-reaching than just the domestic violence act itself. It’s a life.
In addition, supervisors said, they recognize the potential of domestic
violence to breed future crime and violence within families, because they
consider children who witness domestic violence more likely to become
criminally involved themselves. A male detective in Region 1 said:
It’s just the ripple effect of DV. It causes so many problems down the road [for] the
children that see this. My sons and daughters who want to become police officers
are going to be dealing with the same family, perhaps, 20 years from now.
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Finally, several supervisors expressed concern that even the high volume of
domestic violence cases they deal with represents only a fraction of actual
incidents. A male detective from a different Region 1 agency said: “I think
there’s probably a phenomenal amount of domestic violence that goes
unreported.”
At least one agency has taken these concerns a step further by charging
some  adults involved in domestic violence with the additional crime of
contributing to delinquency of a minor. A female Region 2 detective said:
We tell our officers…that [domestic violence is] having an effect upon [children,
and] that if you don’t reach these kids, these are going to be future
offenders….”We started looking at the laws and the research that was coming
out on domestic violence and children [and found] they’re habitually lower
performers in school, that they habitually have drug and alcohol problems…
“[Domestic violence]
affects…a victim’s
interaction in the rest of
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Officers View Domestic Violence as a “Real Crime”
Domestic Violence Warrants Law Enforcement Intervention
Most Arizona law enforcement officers agree with the “criminalization” of
domestic violence, according to both survey responses and interviews. Nearly
eight out of 10 survey respondents disagreed with the statement, “DV is best
handled as a private matter, rather than by the police” (Figure 3).
This outlook contrasts with the “traditional” police approach that advocates and
researchers had long identified as a major obstacle to improved social
responses to domestic violence. That approach categorized most incidents of
domestic violence as “nuisance calls” that family members could — and should
— resolve in private. Changing this attitude has been a key objective of the
decades-long national campaign for pro-arrest statutes and policies. In Arizona,
that effort seems to have been successful. Virtually all supervisors who have
worked in law enforcement long enough to witness this evolution readily
acknowledged the marked change in how their and other agencies respond to
domestic violence calls now compared to 15-20 years ago.
A male supervisor in Region 4 said:
Oh, [it’s been] just an amazing change … When I first got in this job, it was
separate them, make sure everybody’s happy and gone their separate way, and
you moved on. And in lots of instances even where there was obvious assault or
obvious criminal activity, it was [something] for your family to handle. I’ll come
in here and keep you from punching on each other, but you people need to …
fix your family …And then in the ‘90s, the laws came along that said you
don’t have a choice as a police officer….
A male Region 5 supervisor said:
We used to do temporary divorces … [telling the two parties] ‘You put your
hand on my badge, and you put your hand on my badge, and you’re divorced for
the night. You go here and you go there,’ and no arrests were made. Very
informal stuff, just so that really people didn’t go to jail.
A male Region 1 sergeant said:
As a new officer, I would go to a family fight where you could substantiate that
there was in fact a victim there that had been assaulted … And our course of
action was pretty much based on what the victim wanted to do. And if they
didn’t want to prosecute, which years ago was pretty standard … we couldn’t
make an arrest.
“Traditional” attitudes may have greatly diminished among Arizona law
enforcement, but a small minority (6.1%) still agreed that domestic violence,
“… is best handled as a private matter.” One of these wrote: “If there is any
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one type of call that would make me leave patrol, it’s domestic violence.
Domestic violence is a civil matter and is not worthy of police response.” And
not even the most positive attitudes about intervention can prevent the
frustration officers feel over having to return to the same addresses time
after time. Fully nine out of 10 respondents — the highest rate in the entire
survey — agreed that, “A major problem with DV is that there are so many
repeat cases” (Figure 4). Nearly three out of 10 strongly agreed with the
statement. Still, most officers also acknowledged their moral as well as legal
duty to keep showing up when called. For example, a majority (59.8%)
disagreed that, “There should be a limit on how many times I respond to DV
calls from the same victim at the same address.” But with over one in five
agreeing, a warning is clear about frustration (Figure 5).
Officers say the frustration of repeatedly dealing with the same individuals is
heightened by their widespread conviction that these interventions — even
including arrest — will change little in the long run. Officers overwhelmingly
said — as one put it — “we cannot do it alone;” that they cannot deal
successfully with Arizona’s domestic violence problems without support and
follow through from the rest of the criminal justice system, from social-
service providers, and from victims themselves. The policy of criminalization
has generated more arrests, officers say, but has been much less successful
in providing safety and support to victims and accountability to offenders.
The survey responses thus raise questions about how to make good on the
entire promise of criminalization, beyond arrests.
Never Routine, Considered More Dangerous
Officers consider domestic violence calls to be particularly hazardous
assignments. A combined 68.7% of survey respondents agreed with the
statement, “I am more likely to be injured during a DV call than in a violence
call involving strangers.” And while just over a quarter (26.6%) neither agreed
nor disagreed; only 4.8% disagreed (Figure 6). This perception differs from
the findings of national studies, in which researchers have concluded that
domestic violence calls do not necessarily pose a higher risk to officers than
public violence calls. Nevertheless, domestic violence incidents do account
for a considerable number of officer injuries, not least because of the sheer
volume of cases (Buzawa and Buzawa 2003: 80-81).5
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Supervisors worry about domestic violence’s threat to officers. A male
detective in Region 2 described domestic violence calls as, “ … the number
one priority in dangerousness.”
It’s just a hot-bed for emotions. When the deputies respond, they don’t know
what they’re getting into. There can never be a routine DV call. And you never
know how your victim’s going to react. And you don’t know what you’re facing.
Several supervisors commented on the volatility of a situation in which a
victim is suddenly faced with a partner — often the breadwinner — being
arrested and taken to jail. As a male Region 4 supervisor put it:
You go into a domestic violence call and all the wife wanted you to do was to stop
the argument. The law says you take this person into custody and the next thing
you know you’re being assaulted by the other half. So, they are more dangerous.
A woman supervisor in Region 2 expressed a similar view:
One of the things we’ve seen is the victim actually turns on the officer. They’ve
called us for assistance, they want our assistance, but when we get there and
start intervening, we do the investigation, we find out he’s going to jail or she’s
going to jail, then they realize what’s going to happen to the kids … there’s my
income, and so they’ll turn on us, on the officers who are trying to assist them.
One male supervisor in Region 2 considered public knowledge of the pro-
arrest policy as itself adding to the danger:
Once the public knows that if the police respond that somebody’s going to be
arrested, then there is the anticipation that somebody’s going to be arrested. If
they don’t want to be arrested, then the violence increases.
In part, the sense of danger arises from the very fact of entering into the
domestic realm. A sergeant in Region 4 described it as, “You’re going into the
lair, into the home. The dispatcher is saying ‘ there’s no weapons,’ well, every
house has drawers full of butcher knives, rolling pins, frying pans, and that’s
just in the kitchen.”
In addition, the duality of the first responder’s role as both law enforcer and
counselor can produce its own tension. A male detective in Region 2
explained the uncertainty from the officer’s point of view:
The domestic violence call is your most dangerous because there are so many
unknowns. [In] an armed robbery call you … go right into condition red and you
remain there. [With] domestic violence, you can’t go into a condition red as readily
because you still have to look out for the victim, as far as being able to communicate
with them using  your interpersonal skills, showing a little empathy and sympathy.
… But all of a sudden that whole situation can turn around  on you, [and] this
individual that you are speaking with that’s a victim may come after you … It
becomes a very volatile situation and it can go from zero to a hundred in an instant.
“The domestic violence
call is your most
dangerous because there
are so many unknowns.”
— Male Region 2 detective
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Opinions about the Strain on Police
Resources Also Reflect Frustration
Officers differed over whether domestic violence calls take too heavy a toll on
agency resources, with 10.5% strongly agreeing and 19.2% agreeing that “DV
calls take too much of officers’ time and effort.” Roughly a third said yes,
approximately 42% said no, and 28% neither agreed nor disagreed (Figure 7).
These differences point to a debate in progress: On the one hand, officers
know they must respond to domestic violence scenes and agree that they
should; on the other hand, many regret the time and effort these encounters
consume and, as shown in other questions, are pessimistic about the likely
effects of intervention in preventing future incidences.
Concerns about workload might be expected on any issue. But the fact that
so many officers agree is particularly relevant here, given that most Arizona
agencies require first responding officers to gather sufficient evidence at
domestic violence scenes so that prosecution will be possible even if the
victim later decides not to cooperate. The execution and enforcement of this
requirement vary among agencies, according to supervisors, but complaints
about it are common among officers. Concern over the time required may
also be linked to outlooks on prosecution. These are described later in this
report.
Officers Support Arrest Even When Victims Are Reluctant
Survey respondents heavily supported the statement, “I think DV offenders
should be arrested even when victims don’t want it,” with 71.9% agreeing
(Figure 8).
This view again reflects the change from past practices that goes to the
heart of the current pro-arrest approach, which is in part based on the notion
that domestic violence victims may be too traumatized or intimidated to
make wise choices at the scene. Officers’ strong support for arrest policies is
also important given that so many officers express extreme frustration at the
fact that so many victims later refuse to prosecute.
“Why Isn’t Anything Getting Done?”
As noted, officers in all agencies expressed enormous frustration at dealing
with domestic violence calls. This feeling, in fact, was one of the study’s most
widespread findings. Arizona officers’ exasperation cuts across virtually all
responses, all locations, and all ranks. The pervasiveness of this frustration
seems to reduce officers’ support for the pro-arrest policy and their willingness
to follow its requirements.
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A male detective from Region 2 said:
I think [most officers] are very frustrated going to DV calls because for
the most part they are probably responding to a residence they’ve been
to before. [They ask] “Why isn’t anything getting done with these
individuals?”
A male Region 2 officer said:
The victim is mad at us because we took the other party out of the
residence, or the children are mad at us because we’re taking one of
their parents away. You know the person that we arrest is never happy
with us. It’s a lose situation all the way around for us.
A male Region 3 sergeant suggested that frustration arises in
part from the concern for officer safety: “I mean, we see that
they are in an abusive relationship. I mean, it is frustrating to
continually go back there and continually jeopardize my guys’
lives.”
A female Region 2 detective, on the other hand, said officers’
frustration derives in part from their own personalities:
You’re dealing with the personality of somebody who is used to
making things better, used to taking charge, and used to having
things happen because they say they are going to happen. And [in
cases of] domestic violence … we can’t do that, and it’s a real
frustrating crime.
A male Region 5 sergeant said: “You get to a point where you
are just sick and tired of talking to people. You’re sick and tired
of seeing the same people over and over and over. You’re sick
of the same call over and over and over.”
Nevertheless, officers’ majority support for a pro-arrest policy
does mark a noteworthy change in the law enforcement
approach to domestic violence, and even perhaps in what’s
often called “police culture” — the underlying complex of
beliefs and values said to be shared by the insular community
of sworn law enforcement personnel. Interestingly, survey
responses show that 34% of officers with relatively few years
in law enforcement (3.5 years or less) were more likely to agree that, “DV is
best handled as a private matter,” than those with more than 12 years of
experience (11%). This finding suggests that agencies should focus on the
attitudes of officers with the least experience, rather than those with the
most time on the force.
It’s Different in the City:
Outlooks Among
Urban and Rural Officers
Arizona is a place of many contrasts, not least being
the divergent patterns of life in its urban and rural
areas. It thus might not be surprising that different
attitudes towards domestic violence emerged between
urban and rural law enforcement officers. In this
study, “urban” agencies are defined as those operating
in the urban areas of Maricopa and Pima counties.
Officers in these areas report responding to much
higher volumes of domestic violence calls than their
colleagues in “rural” areas – which include smaller
Arizona cities.
Urban officers, in fact, were more likely than their
rural colleagues to express exasperation at the sheer
volume of domestic violence calls, to agree that calls
take too much time and effort, and to view too many
calls as involving merely verbal arguments. Urban
officers were more likely than rural ones to want
more freedom in handling domestic violence calls, to
feel that they should arrest only in clear cases of
injury, and to believe that arrests seldom help reduce
future violence. They also were more likely to agree
that domestic violence is best handled as a private
matter, that there should be a limit on how many
times they respond to the same address, and that
victims are often as responsible for a domestic
violence incident as the person arrested.
Rural officers, on the other hand, were more likely to
agree that an arrest policy is the best approach to
domestic violence, that they need stricter guidelines
from supervisors, that offenders should be arrested
even when victims don’t want it, and that more
training would help them do a better job on domestic
violence calls.
24 Morrison Institute for Public Policy
LAYERS OF MEANING:
D O M E S T I C  V I O L E N C E  A N D  L A W  E N F O R C E M E N T  A T T I T U D E S  I N  A R I Z O N A
Officers Consider Arrest Alone of
Limited Value in Reducing Domestic Violence
Police Show Mixed Support for the State’s Pro-Arrest Policy
Arizona law enforcement officers make approximately 24,000 domestic
violence arrests annually. State law requires them in most cases to arrest
domestic violence suspects who inflict injury or display weapons, and
authorizes them to arrest in other circumstances.
In general, this study finds that Arizona officers agree that an “in-custody”
arrest — meaning removal from the home in handcuffs and usually a jail stay
— is often the necessary and proper response to domestic violence incidents.
At the same time, however, they remain highly skeptical about the long-term
deterrence effects and problem-solving value of these arrests — at least as
they are currently processed in Arizona’s criminal justice system. Officers
believe that to be truly effective, arrests should trigger other justice and
community services that could prompt positive changes in the behavior of
victims and offenders, and, eventually, a reduction in the level of domestic
violence. But they say this follow-through often does not happen or is stymied
by a lack of sufficient resources and personnel to adequately address the
high volume of domestic violence cases.
In fact, based on officers’ responses, it would not be an exaggeration to say
that they believe that Arizona’s pro-arrest policy — as currently practiced — is
not working to reduce the number and severity of domestic violence incidents.
Officers’ ambivalence appears, for example, in their response to the
statement, “An arrest policy is the best approach to DV calls.” Respondents
were evenly distributed on the issue (Figure 9). Officers outside of major urban
areas were more likely to agree with the statement, as were officers who
answered 20 or fewer domestic violence calls in the previous year.
The substantial “neither agree nor disagree” response (31.8%) and the small
number of “strongly agree” (4.8%) responses highlight that the pro-arrest
policy may leave officers with fewer choices than they might want.
Respondents’ lack of support for arrest as the “best” policy may reflect a
view that it is often the only response available, which in many cases they
feel is inappropriate and ineffective. The third of neutral responses may also
reveal a feeling that a single approach is a mismatch to what is perceived as
the unique nature of each domestic violence situation.
The split responses to this statement might seem contrary to officers’
apparent acceptance of domestic violence as a crime calling for police
intervention. If domestic violence is a crime, why wouldn’t arrest be the best
approach? Qualitative data suggest that officers’ reservations about arrests
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stem not so much from dissatisfaction with the action itself, but rather from
the restrictions placed upon them by their departments’ pro-arrest policies,
and what they view as chronic lack of follow-up by other actors in the criminal
justice system.
Support for the policy was expressed by a male Region 1 detective:
That policy for mandatory arrest needs to be there. One, it’s nice to get these
guys off the streets. Two, it gives us a night off from them for a little while. And
I think it teaches them a lesson.
A male Region 5 lieutenant agreed, adding that, “It takes a lot of the burden off
mom, who maybe is abused but she’s mentally trained that that’s the situation
she needs to live in.” A female detective in Region 3 said,
I’m very much into pro-arrest, and maybe it’s my 20 years in law enforcement
because I think it really sends a message … It allows for a lot of healing, a lot of
services to be in place that maybe will assist them in repairing their family unit.
A female detective in Region 2 said she thinks the pro-arrest policy also, “…
eliminates the macho police attitude with some officers … They don’t have a
choice.”
In fact, a male Region 5 sergeant said that not having a choice can be easier
on officers:
You’re a person, too, and you hear all these things going on [at the scene] and
you feel for one party or the other and your emotions get involved whether you
like it or not. So a lot of times you really are thinking, “Man, I don’t want to
arrest this person.” But they did what they did and that’s that.
Supervisors — like this male Region 2 officer — also cited arrests as
preventing potential liabilities for law enforcement agencies:
I don’t want to put the department in the position of incurring a liability if we
go [to a call] and we make a bad decision and we leave [a suspect] in the house
and it turns violent after we leave.
A male Region 5 sergeant said the pro-arrest policy made it easier for him
and other supervisors to advise officers calling for guidance from domestic
violence scenes. But many officers see the situation differently. As one
respondent wrote: “I feel DV arrest laws are too strict. Almost every time state
law requires an arrest and victim does not want to prosecute, the victim
almost always never shows up for court and the cases are thrown out.”
Supervisors who expressed reservations about the “pro-arrest” approach cited
two other concerns. One was the toll that arrests take on department time and
resources; another was — as a female Region 2 supervisor said — that making
“I’m very much into
pro-arrest, and maybe
it’s my 20 years in law
enforcement because I
think it really sends a
message … It allows for
a lot of healing, a lot of
services to be in place
that maybe will assist
them in repairing their
family unit.”
— Female Region 3 detective
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an arrest “… has a huge financial impact. Boarding someone at jail is not
cheap.” And a male Region 2 sergeant asked whether officers should be
required to arrest a suspect who fled at the time of the incident and is
encountered by officers later. “Two or three days later, is the mandatory arrest
necessary?” he asked. “If we go back in there and say an arrest is necessary,
you make enemies of the victims.”
In addition, officers noted that an arrest, even when warranted by
circumstances, can simply add to the woes of already troubled families. “In
our area, [given] the economic issues out there, it’s harder on the families if
[suspects] go to jail,” a female Region 1 detective said, “especially if … the
whole reason they’re fighting is because of money.” A male sergeant from
Region 2 cited what he considers another downside to the pro-arrest policy:
We’ve trained these families that are involved in domestic violence. They know
after the first time, hey, we have a mandatory arrest policy. So when I show up
at Mr. and Mrs. Smith’s house, and Mrs. Smith’s got a black eye, she says, “The
dog jumped up and hit me in the eye,” knowing full well that if she says that
[he hit her], there goes the breadwinner out of the house. Or [she thinks], “If
I’m the cause of him getting arrested, it’s going to be worse for me next time.”
And even supervisors who support the policy said that making an arrest
serves only an immediate purpose. “I’m 100% behind it,” said a male Region
4 sergeant. “[But] all I can do is make a difference at the minute. It’s up to
the courts to make a difference forever.”
Officers Have Little Faith in Arrest’s Deterrent Effects
A Region 1 lieutenant said he’s convinced that a victim’s initial 911 call
rarely marks the first actual instance of domestic violence:
Usually it’s like when you catch a shoplifter – although they say it’s their first
time, when you catch a DV [offender] it’s not their first time … There’s so
many different levels of domestic violence that maybe it didn’t register [with the
victim] until they actually were slapped.
Interviews with domestic violence shelter staff support that assertion. Thus,
victims who call 911 may already have suffered multiple times without
intervention, making the arrest a potentially dramatic break with the past.
Yet most officers put little stock in arrest’s preventive power for any but a few
offenders.
A majority — 58.1% — agreed (Figure 10) that “Arresting someone at a DV call
seldom helps reduce future DV incidents.” Officers from metro Phoenix and
Tucson were more likely to agree, as were those who answer high numbers of
calls. In the interviews, supervisors concurred. They repeatedly noted the
heavier impact arrest typically has on employed, generally law-abiding
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“[But] all I can do is
make a difference at the
minute. It’s up to the
courts to make a
difference forever.”
— Male Region 4 sergeant
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residents, compared with those already living outside conventional social
norms. This Arizona view echoes national “stake-in-conformity” studies,
which found that arrest more often deterred future violence when suspects
had jobs (Maxwell, Graner et al. 2001).
A male Region 1 detective said:
If [a suspect] is holding down a job, if they have to pay the bills, if they are a
responsible person and know they might get more jail time next time, I think
[arrest] is going to deter them. But [with] people who don’t work, or work job-
to-job, or [heavily use] drugs and alcohol, I don’t think it’s going to deter them
very much.
A male Region 4 captain agreed: “The middle-class family where dad’s got a
job and mom’s taking care of the kids and he gets arrested for the one time
he lost his temper, I think it makes a difference.” A male Region 1 detective
said, “I’ve seen men break down and cry because they’re so scared of what’s
happening. They’ve never been through this before.”
Not so with suspects who have few connections to the community mainstream
— and who form the majority of suspects in the estimates of most supervisors.
These “frequent flyers” usually see little that’s damaging, humiliating, or even
unusual about being booked. A trip to jail has not deterred them in the past
and is unlikely to alter their behavior in the future. “They see it as a routine
occurrence,” the Region 4 captain said. “[They’ll say] ‘Well, I got popped for DV
this week,’ and maybe you got arrested for dope last week or burglary the week
before,” he said. “For those people, it doesn’t matter.”
A female Region 1 detective said, “I’ve had plenty of people tell me, ‘I did not
want to go back to jail.’ But people that have been there a few times, you
know, basically it’s, ‘Yeah, it’s just another day down there.’” A female Region
2 detective said arrest doesn’t deter most suspects, “because [to end
abusive behavior] they have to change their entire life, how they handle
stresses. And you’re not going to avoid stresses in your life.”
A male Region 1 detective said that the amount of deterrence also might in
part rest upon the attitude of the arresting officer:
I think it depends very much on the officers who arrest the person. I’ve booked
[domestic violence suspects] in jail after getting in a fight with them [and] my
adrenaline’s pumping and I’d love nothing more than to … get even, but I’ve
found that when you treat them with respect … and just have a conversation
with them, I’ve had some guys [who say], “I never really thought about [spouse
abuse] like that” … You kind of have a counseling session, type of thing.
But a Region 5 sergeant said, “Every once in a great while we’ll see [a repeat
offender] that says ‘Enough is enough’ and they end the relationship. But it
“If [a suspect] is holding
down a job, if they have
to pay the bills, if they
are a responsible person
and know they might get
more jail time next time,
I think [arrest] is going
to deter them.”
— Male Region 1 detective
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usually doesn’t have anything to do with the aggressor going to jail. It’s
usually the victim deciding they’ve had enough.”
A female Region 2 detective said:
I would like to say yes [that arrests deter future violence]. I think if the
[offender] wasn’t drunk or high, if there wasn’t so much emotion involved [at
the time of the incident], I would say that it would be a deterrent. But I think
at that point, [the offender says], “I don’t care.”
Asked what good the pro-arrest policy is if it doesn’t deter future violence,
she said: “It keeps people alive for another night.”
In some cases, another night will likely bring just another argument and
another 911 call. “Many of our repeat offenders are families that argue
about everything, but we [are] still mandated to respond up to five times per
week.” A male Region 5 lieutenant said:
Probably about half of all DV calls are … repeat calls for us, and some of them
are multiple repeat calls. We’ve had instances where it seemed like every week,
we’re going over to a particular residence and either arresting one or the other.
And it isn’t just one victim. Sometimes it’s one party, the next time, it’s the
other party.
The high rate of repeat calls further suggests that, in too many cases, arrest
in Arizona currently provides only a short-term respite from conflict and
violence. Arrest clearly has its uses in combating domestic violence, officers
say, but prevention of future violence seems seldom to be one of them.
Widespread Resentment of “Verbal-only” Calls
At the same time, officers complain that too much of their time is wasted on
domestic violence calls that don’t come close to requiring arrest. Two-thirds of
respondents agreed that, “Too many DV calls are for only verbal family
arguments,” (Figure 11). Officers from busier urban areas throughout
Maricopa County concurred more often, as did officers with 3.6-6.5 years
experience, those with less training (0-1 sessions attended) and those who
reported answering a higher volume of calls in the previous year (150+). Busy
officers resent going to scenes where, in their opinion, there is a low level of
risk to residents.
A male Region 4 sergeant said, “We’ll get [to a scene] and there’s no injuries,
no criminal damage or anything … And both parties [will say] ‘we were just
arguing. Can’t we argue?’ It’s OK to argue.”
One survey respondent wrote: “Most calls are verbal only, no crime. If we only
responded to physical violence calls, officers would take it more seriously.”
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“It [arrest] keeps people
alive for another night.”
— Female Region 2 detective
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Another wrote: “Most calls are labeled as domestic violence when in fact they
are just arguments.” A third wrote: “Most DV calls are verbal. They say
communication is the only way to solve problems and we should allow that to
happen, and not need to arrest someone for that.”
Conversely, a male Region 1 sergeant said it would be wrong to discount
“verbals” entirely:
I wouldn’t say they are nothing, [because] somebody’s upset about something to
the point where they had to call the police. So even if it is verbal, maybe it
hasn’t gotten to the point where it’s physical yet. But at least we’re still getting
there and we’re intervening before that does happen.
Of course, officers cannot know the nature of a call until they arrive. Once at
the scene, they must decide what level of conflict triggers an arrest. Asked to
comment on, “Police should arrest in DV cases only when there is clear
evidence of injury,” opinions were split: 41.6% agreed, 17.2% neither agreed
nor disagreed, and 41.2% disagreed (Figure 12). Non-white officers were
more likely to agree with this statement than white officers, as were officers
in major urban areas, those in Region 1, and those who had had fewer
training sessions. One officer who favored limiting arrests wrote: “Sometimes
the letter of the law regarding DV/criminal damage seems exaggerated. I’ve
seen something minor that was broken and felt obligated to arrest.” Another
wrote: “I think we arrest during arguments just to cover the department.”
Then again, a supervisor noted in an interview that arresting someone for
disorderly conduct or criminal damage might be preventing a later assault.
This even split among officers on the issue of arrests and injury reflects a
similar significant division in the broader community over how domestic
violence should be defined. Researchers, advocates, and mental health
professionals note that verbal, financial, and emotional abuse can be as
damaging as some physical abuse and are as much parts of the overall
pattern of abuse as assaults. Law enforcement officers, however, must
respond to domestic violence as it is construed in law and policy. And while
they clearly see domestic violence as a crime, the exact definition of what
should count and what is the best response in each situation is less clear cut.
Officers Say Dual Arrests Are Decreasing
Dual arrest — arresting both parties at a domestic violence scene — did not
find favor with most officers, as only 11.6% agreed with the statement, “It’s
often best to arrest both parties in DV calls” (Figure 13). Past national
research has suggested that high numbers of dual arrests have in part
reflected officers’ frustration with the difficulty of figuring out who’s to blame
in a domestic conflict, as well as their overall resistance to pro-arrest
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requirements (Buzawa and Buzawa 2003: 138). In the current study,
supervisors said that dual arrests — dubbed the “family plan” by some — are
increasingly rare in the wake of many departments’ recent training efforts to
help officers identify the “primary aggressor” at the scene.
It wasn’t always so. A Region 5 sergeant said:
When I first came out on the road, it was “solve the immediate problem.” If
that means take everybody to jail, then they all go. If we get there and they’re
yelling and screaming and they won’t shut up, just hook everybody up and take
them, just so we don’t have to deal with it over and over and over again.
But he added: “Now they’re telling us if we do a dual arrest, we’d better be
damned sure that we can prove that both parties were aggressors.”
A male Region 4 supervisor said:
I watch [dual arrest] in our people because I don’t want that to become a habit.
I don’t want [officers to have the attitude that] ‘Just because you made me come
to your house, everybody goes to jail.’
A male Region 1 detective cited another drawback: “[Dual arrest] is an
absolute waste because [prosecutors] never prosecute … They just say it’s a
mutual [combat situation], and that’s it.”
A female Region 4 sergeant said:
A lot of our victims … finally have had enough of being the victim and they
fight back, and the officers want to make a [dual] arrest. [But] you’ve got to
look at what actually happened here and go a little deeper. And most of the
time, [officers] understand that.
Still, dual arrest does sometimes make sense, as a male Region 2 lieutenant
said:
If it’s clear that they are both combative, they’re both intoxicated, they’re both
fully engaged in this thing and … they were both aggressively fighting [and]
knocking stuff over in front of the children, absolutely … there’s no question
that both need to go.
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Officers Often Struggle to
Understand Victims’ Actions and Attitudes
The nationwide adoption of pro-arrest laws was advocated and accomplished
in the name of victims. Researchers, domestic violence workers, victims-
rights advocates, feminists and others argued that the criminal justice
system’s traditional hands-off attitude toward “family fights” condemned
victims — overwhelmingly women — to lives of hidden suffering, tacitly
endorsed violence as acceptable behavior, and ensured the perpetuation of
societal ills through successive generations. Critics charged that officers’
reluctance to arrest batterers stemmed in some measure from their view of
many domestic violence victims as irresponsible and unreliable, and from
the general devaluation of women inherent in male-dominated “police
culture.”
The proper social response, they said, was prosecution of domestic violence
as a crime and help for women to leave abusive relationships. Thus, a large
part of the solution depended on deep, sustained involvement by those who
had been labeled as part of the problem. Prosecutions start with arrests, and
obtaining those required a turnaround in actions and attitudes at every level
of law enforcement — but especially on the front lines. The solution, policy
makers decided, also included victims’ being advised and assisted to leave
abusive relationships. Here, law enforcement officers also were called upon
to contribute by providing information to victims and encouraging steps
toward better lives.
Clearly, the system to reduce domestic violence desired by advocates,
supported by research, and agreed to by policy makers in Arizona and across
the country depended to a significant extent on law enforcement officers
having sufficient knowledge of domestic violence and the “right” attitudes.
Much attention has been focused on these goals, from passing pro-arrest
statutes to allocating dollars for law enforcement training and special
domestic violence units to creating domestic violence shelters and services.
This study found a diversity of opinion among officers about victims and
domestic violence responses. Many responses suggest that “police culture”
may not be as monolithic as is often portrayed. Officers exhibit such a range
of opinion that a single interpretation is difficult. At the same time, the
results reveal lingering ambivalence toward domestic violence victims. This is
not to suggest that Arizona law-enforcement officers condone violence,
oppose punishment for offenders, or lack sympathy for victims — the survey
and interviews show officers striving to do their best on a challenging and
frustrating assignment. Nevertheless, the findings call attention to attitudes
toward victims that seem strong and widespread enough potentially to
detract from the quality of domestic violence enforcement.
Women officers were more likely than
men to agree that officers need more
training and stricter guidelines from
supervisors in handling domestic violence
calls. Women also were more likely to
believe that suspects should be arrested
even when victims don’t want it, and that
domestic violence stems from abusers’
need for power and control over victims.
Female officers saw mental health
problems as a more serious contributor to
domestic violence than men. They also
seem more ready to acknowledge the
problem of domestic violence in general,
with a higher percentage of women
officers agreeing that “DV is a significant
problem in the community I serve.”
Male officers, on the other hand, were
more likely to favor more freedom to
handle domestic violence calls. Men also
indicated greater impatience with victims.
Male officers were more likely to agree
that domestic violence calls take too
much time and effort, that many victims
could easily leave their abusive
relationships, that victims often
exaggerate the amount of violence, and
that most victims are safer as soon as they
leave an abusive relationship.
Significant differences also appeared in
survey responses from white and non-
white officers. Non-white officers are
more likely than white officers to think
that domestic violence calls are especially
dangerous, that police should arrest only
upon clear evidence of injury, that many
victims could easily leave their
relationships, that most calls are isolated
events in otherwise good relationships,
and that repeat cases are a major
problem. In other words, these officers
tended to express more “traditional”
attitudes about domestic violence than
white officers.
A Diverse Police Force
Produces Diverse Opinions
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Some Officers Question Victims’ Behavior
For example, approximately a third of officers believe that victims play a role in
bringing violence on themselves. Survey responses broke out fairly evenly on
the statement, “DV victims are often as responsible for the incident as the
person arrested,” with 6.6% strongly agreeing and 29.7% agreeing (overall
36.3% agreement), 35.1% neither agreeing nor disagreeing, and 24.7%
disagreeing and 3.9 strongly disagreeing (overall 28.6% disagreement) (Figure
14). Officers from major urban areas and throughout Region 1 were more likely
to agree with the statement. Exactly where officers think victims’ responsibility
lies is not clear. One possibility is that officers are referring to the fact that
many domestic violence victims remain in abusive relationships despite efforts
by police and others to help them leave.
A female detective in Region 2 said: “We say our worst enemies are our
victims.”
A male Region 1 detective expressed what seems to be a widespread
wariness among officers about victims:
Not to sound, you know, insensitive, but I never really see like a true victim [in
domestic violence cases], like I assume I’m going to see. Like I anticipated – and I
know they’re out there. But when I think of domestic violence, I think of the cycle
of violence that occurs, and [the victim] can’t get out, and they’re being really beat
… But I never really found that here. I just found … fights, arguments that
break out where at least both people are scrapping at each other.”
The victims, of course, did not deserve to be assaulted, the detective said.
But they may have:
… escalated the situation and certainly maybe participated in it. And … I see
so many [domestic violence] reports where sometimes I feel like there’s other
issues behind the scenes. Custody battles, divorce proceedings, you know. Many
times I look at a report and I think … there’s a civil custody battle going on is
why I’m getting this report.
Another factor in officers’ opinions may be that many victims do not welcome
law enforcement intervention. Or, they may be unaware of what the law
requires of law enforcement personnel. Officers frequently complained about
victims’ actions and attitudes at the scene and later in the prosecution
process. In most cases, officers said, victims are glad when they arrive and
stop the threatened or actual violence. Later, however, many victims become
a hindrance to the further execution of the legal process. Also, victims may
be unhappy to see officers when they themselves did not initiate the
intervention.
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“Not to sound, you
know, insensitive, but
I never really see
like a true victim [in
domestic violence
cases], like I assume
I’m going to see.”
— Male Region 1 detective
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A female Region 2 detective said:
I don’t think people realize the level of difficulty that DV victims are for us.
Intellectually, we know that’s all part of being a domestic violence victim. But when
the media hits, it’s always, “The police department didn’t do this, didn’t do that.”
And they don’t know how long we fought with this victim to try to help her help us
… We fight with our victims as bad as we fight with our suspects.
A female Region 4 sergeant said:
If a third party calls us to respond, [the victim] is not quite as receptive, saying,
“Why are you interfering? We’re just arguing. Nothing’s going on, there’s no
fighting, it’s none of your business.”
A female sergeant in Region 4 said:
Nothing makes me more angry than going [to a scene] and the victim doesn’t
want to tell us what happened. We had one the other day; he had a knife and
she would not tell us that he had a knife … I mean, [in] the majority of the
cases there are children involved, and not only is she being the victim but she’s
teaching them it’s OK to be the victim or it’s OK to be the aggressor because it’s
just standard practice.
A male Region 2 detective said:
A lot of times they don’t want to be a victim. They’re like, “No, nothing
happened” – [even though] the victim has a big black eye …And you’re trying to
extract information without re-victimizing the victim.
A female Region 2 detective said:
[Some] victims call us every filthy name in the book and tell us that we’re
splitting their family apart, and “You don’t know him” and … “We can work it
out.” By then, the [domestic violence] cycle has started again and they don’t
want to hear from us.
Intervention Can Be Frustrating for Officers Who Set out to “Save”
Fully half of the respondents disagreed with the statement, “Most DV victims
are receptive to interventions by law enforcement.” Just one out of five agreed
(Figure 15). The level of disagreement rose with the number of calls officers
reported answering.
One respondent wrote: “The more we [do], the more it seems a useless cause.
Uncooperative victims are the biggest, most frustrating problems with
domestic violence.” Another wrote: “Victims seem to just feel sorry for
themselves, and don’t look for a real way out. By the time it goes to court they
are ‘in love’ again.” A third officer wrote: “Most of our ‘victims’ get the suspect
out of jail the next day and don’t show up in court. They only called 911 to stop
“But when the media
hits, it’s always, ‘The
police department
didn’t do this, didn’t
do that.’ And they
don’t know how long
we fought with this
victim to try to help
her help us  … We
fight with our victims
as bad as we fight
with our suspects.”
— Female Region 2 detective
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the suspect from hitting them at that moment. They waste our time.” And
another asked for, “Consequences for victims who recant their stories, fail to
appear at trial or who take no action to solve the situation.”
This situation contrasts dramatically with other law enforcement
circumstances, where victims usually are appreciative of officers’ work. The
ideal image of law enforcement officers as welcome rescuers and
peacemakers clashes with the reality of many domestic violence situations. A
male Region 4 supervisor said this can take a toll on officer morale:
You know, a fireman is always a good guy no matter what he’s doing …
Usually, in a violence call, there’s an aggressor and there’s a victim. In domestic
violence, the victim doesn’t always want to be a victim. And they’ll turn on you
… You’re not always the knight in shining armor …
Officers say they understand why some victims are reluctant to cooperate. A
female Region 1 detective noted one reason:
[Some victims] don’t want to aid in prosecution because they are illegal
[immigrants] and they’re afraid of deportation. So they’d rather be abused than
be sent back to Mexico.
Officers say many victims who call 911 do not fully realize the consequences
— and are not pleased when they find out. A male Region 2 detective said:
When we get there, there’s been plenty of times that [the victim] says, I just want
him to stop.” And we’ll say, “Well, we have to take him to jail.” And she goes,
“Well, can’t you just do something else?” So in these cases … they weren’t really
overly thrilled that we were taking him to jail. And I would say … that in maybe
80% of the cases they weren’t overly thrilled that we were there … Kids [are]
screaming, wife upset, we’re taking him out. But that’s all we can do.
Another issue is the passage of time that can elapse between arrest and
follow-up investigations by busy detectives. A male Region 2 detective said:
We’re getting to these cases six, seven, eight, nine months down the road. In that
time [the suspect] has been let out of jail, he’s gone to counseling, he’s done
whatever, he’s apologized and said it’ll never happen again. [The victim has]
accepted him – and we’re going back and contacting them. [So the victim says], “I
don’t want to do anything. We’re back together and everything’s good.”
Then, officers said, there’s the cold reality of economic survival. A female
Region 2 detective said:
[The offender is] in jail again. But now, there’s no paycheck. There’s three kids
in diapers. Everything’s in his name. [So the victim says] “I have nothing. I’m
going to get kicked out of my home. My family tells me I need to go home. He’s
a good man. He’s a provider. I need to go home and shut my mouth.”
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“… You’re not always
the knight in
shining armor …”
— Male Region 4 supervisor
“… in maybe 80% of the
cases they weren’t overly
thrilled that we were
there … Kids [are]
screaming, wife upset,
we’re taking him out.
But that’s
all we can do”
— Male Region 2 detective
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If some victims are unhappy with law enforcement’s efforts, officers say
others exaggerate their plight. For example, four out of 10 officers expressed
skepticism about victims’ accounts of domestic violence incidents. Asked to
comment on the statement, “DV victims often exaggerate the amount of
violence involved,” 40.5% of respondents agreed, 34.5% neither agreed nor
disagreed, and 25% disagreed (Figure 16). Male officers were more likely to
agree, as were officers from Regions 1 and 4.
A variation on this theme was expressed by a male Region 5 supervisor:
I’ve gone to these cases where the woman or man – it’s happened both ways –
[says], “I’m deathly afraid he’s going to come back and kill me.” And you say,
“Well, we need to get you to the shelter for the evening.” [And the victim says]
“Are you kidding? I can’t leave my stereo. He’ll come back and bust up my
stereo.” Now, how seriously can you take this person?
Substance Abuse Often Seems to Play a Part
Some officers who see victims bearing some responsibility for their situation
may be referring to victims’ use of drugs or alcohol as factors in violent
incidents. In interviews, supervisors repeatedly cited drug and alcohol abuse
as major contributors to domestic violence — as they are to other crimes. A
female region 2 detective said, “[We] started keeping track years ago, and
what my own percentages show [is that] in our cases at least 93% [of
incidents have] either drugs or alcohol involved [with] either [party].”
A Region 1 detective said drug abuse can be part of the bond holding an
abusive relationship together: “If they are both addicted to drugs, and she
gets the drugs from him, she might be willing to be hit twice a week and stay
in the relationship.”
Line officers, however, seemed less sure about the role of substance abuse.
In response to the statement, “Substance abuse by the victim is a primary
cause of DV,” respondents were evenly split: 32.2% of officers agreed, 30.9%
neither agreed nor disagreed, and 37% disagreed (Figure 17). There were no
significant variations across sub-groupings of officers. Officers were more
uniform in citing the problem of substance abuse by domestic violence
offenders, with 58.3% agreeing that, “Substance abuse by the suspect is a
primary cause of DV,” and only 11.6% disagreeing (Figure 18). There were no
significant differences across officer subgroups.
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Many Officers Have Limited Understanding of Victims’ Predicament
Officers’ frustration with victim behavior was most strongly revealed in their
response to the statement, “Many DV victims could easily leave their
relationships, but don’t.” Three out of 10 strongly agreed and 42% agreed
(Figure 19). Male officers were more likely to express this view, as were non-
white officers, those from Region 1, those with less domestic violence
training, and those who reported answering higher numbers of calls.
Research on domestic violence has found that the physical injuries
witnessed by police are often only the outward manifestation of a deeper,
more insidious form of trauma. Researchers have sought to further explain
victims’ reluctance to leave abusive relationships by citing the paralyzing
impact of degraded self-esteem and of long-term psychological manipulation
by offenders who mix threats, humiliation and violence with apologies,
affection and pledges of better behavior. Indeed, the research concludes that
control over the victim — psychological, physical, and sexual — is the
batterer’s primary goal, and is pursued via a pattern of behavior that can
render victims susceptible to depression, assorted medical problems, and
even post-traumatic stress disorder (Buzawa and Buzawa 2003: 16-25).
These patterns of behavior, sometimes called the “cycle of violence,” can be
largely hidden to those outside the relationship — and the results of the
current study suggest that many officers are either insufficiently aware of
them or not persuaded of their importance. A male captain in Region 4
seemed to reflect the latter view:
You have to ask yourself – well, we talked about the circle of violence and we
know about all these little phases and everything – but whatever happened to
personal accountability in life?
A female Region 1 detective said:
There’s very little sympathy for some [victims]. You have people that put
themselves in the [abusive] situation, and they’ve been given resources, they’ve
been provided with shelter and information, they’ve been given every possible
outlet that we have available … and they continue to choose to put themselves
in the situation.
A female Region 2 detective said:
The percentage is very high as to [victims] that don’t want us. We have a policy
that if a victim says [later] that they lied [about having been assaulted], we tell
them … that’s a crime and you can be arrested for it.
In interviews, other supervisors said they understand why many victims find
it difficult to leave.
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A female Region 1 detective said:
A lot of [victims] … grew up in that environment, and they move from an
abusive father to an abusive husband. Even though they know, technically, this is
wrong, on some sub-level they don’t know that they shouldn’t be in that
situation … Their brothers or their father or their grandfather – somebody’s
abused them.
A male Region 1 detective said:
Sometimes it sounds ridiculous, but you’ll have a victim where they really think
that [abusive] behavior is normal. They think that every husband, you know,
hits them in the head with a rolling pin.
The same detective noted a more basic reason:
You know, [the victim says], “I love him. He beats the crap out of me but I love
him. I don’t want to hurt him even though he hurts me.”
In a related issue, most officers supported the statement that “Most victims
are safer as soon as they leave an abusive relationship,” with 62.9%
agreeing (Figure 20). Male officers, those from major urban areas, those with
less training, and those who’ve responded to more calls were more likely to
agree. Views also varied across regions, but no clear pattern emerged. While
the statement seems plausible, or even obviously true, research has
suggested that the most dangerous time for a domestic violence victim
might indeed be just after they leave the abusive relationship. Scholars say
this counter-intuitive situation stems from abusers’ escalating the violence
precisely because they are losing control. Officers may have looked at the
survey statement as referring to long-term safety or as the clean break
needed to start a new life. However, the responses here could signal an
important lack of knowledge about specific aspects of domestic violence.
Officers May Be Uneasy with the
Dual Role of Policing and Counseling
Finally, other interview responses concerning victims are worth noting. The
first suggests that officers’ attitudes towards victims flow in part from the
fact that officers do not like to function as “social workers,” are skeptical of
the possibilities of counseling, and feel unqualified to try. Rather, they see
their function in terms of more concrete challenges and outcomes. A male
Region 5 sergeant said:
We know all the stuff that goes on in family life, and we feel [victims’] pain –
we really do. But you don’t want to sit there and counsel somebody [when] you
know it’s not going to help. There’s been plenty of times where I’m sitting there
and I’m thinking, “What the hell am I going to tell this person that’s going to
make it any better?”
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And a female Region 1 detective noted the baggage that some officers bring
to a domestic violence scene:
Frustration [also arises] because there’s plenty of officers that have been involved
in [their own] domestic violence situations. And sometimes I think maybe they
see a reflection of themselves in these things, and they tend to be harsher and
more frustrated because they can’t control their [own] lives. So they go, “Why
aren’t you fixing this?” But I’m saying that, on their level, they’re doing it,
they’ve living with the same type of thing. I’ve seen that.
A male Region 2 detective said:
There’s a line of thought that says police officers, despite their best intention and
training, still kind of tend to be macho guys who think, “I’m not a social
worker. I’m supposed to chase bad guys, not mess with family disputes.”
A male Region 3 sergeant was more blunt:
Realistically, officers could give a shit about counseling. Most of us don’t like
going there and having to fix [families’] problems. We want to go there and take
care of what we have the capability of taking care of because we know that a lot
of times these victims, they’re listening but they’re not hearing us. And so we’re
going there and we’re preaching and preaching this stuff, but we know it’s
falling on deaf ears and nothing’s going to change.
A female Region 1 detective said:
We don’t normally hang around. We’re not a counseling service. You know, we
do what we can. But our purpose is criminal, and once the threat’s removed,
we’re usually done with that individual until it’s time to go to court.
Ideally, officers said, assistance would come in the form of a multi-agency
response team — which does exist in some jurisdictions — that could respond
directly to certain domestic violence scenes. A male Region 1 detective said:
[What’s needed are] information dissemination and sharing and open
communications lines between these different services … [If that happens], these
victims and suspects are going to have people coming at them from all angles.
The success rate when you do things like this multi-disciplinary angle … is
much improved.
But this view was not unanimous. A female Region 3 detective said
sometimes victims don’t want to have to tell their story to a second person
after having already told it to an officer. And she added:
Our philosophy of community policing … is if you have to sit down and talk to
a victim for a while, that’s what you do. Our officers are pretty good at that. We
don’t have too many that just want to shuffle the emotional stuff off somewhere
else. And that [attitude] lends itself to a lot better service in a community and a
lot better rapport with our community.
“Frustration [also
arises] because there’s
plenty of officers that
have been involved in
[their own] domestic
violence situations.”
— Female Region 1 detective
“Our philosophy of
community policing …
is if you have to sit
down and talk to a
victim for a while,
that’s what you do.
Our officers are pretty
good at that. We don’t
have too many that
just want to shuffle
the emotional stuff
off somewhere else.”
— Female Region 3 detective
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Officers Feel Too Few Cases Are Prosecuted
The arrest of a domestic violence suspect is only the beginning of the
criminal justice process, which in general continues through investigation,
prosecution, and sentencing — and perhaps further monitoring by probation
officers. However, many Arizona officers express significant dissatisfaction
with what they consider a lack of system follow-up. In other words, street-
level officers widely feel that when it comes to coping with domestic violence
cases they are too often on their own.
Prosecutors Particularly Are Viewed as Dropping the Ball
For example, over half of respondents did not see prosecutors as following
up effectively on cases. In response to the statement, “In my experience,
prosecutors usually follow up effectively on DV arrests,” a minority agreed
(14.4%), some 31.2% neither agreed nor disagreed, and 54.4% disagreed
(Figure 21).
The negative numbers on this statement show the high level of concern
among Arizona officers about prosecution. They perceive the current level of
prosecution as too little, too late. This dissatisfaction with another criminal
justice branch may be because many busy patrol-level officers, and even
detectives, say they simply cannot keep up with what happens to their cases.
Or, they may be unaware of circumstances that changed the course of the
case. Communication between officers or detectives and prosecutors from
this research appears to be much more superficial, and much less often,
than those outside the system might expect or assume.
The deluge of critical comments on prosecution, from officers on survey
forms and from supervisors in interviews, attests to the depth of feeling on
the issue. Complaints about lack of prosecution were the most common
among the more than 600 comments written by officers. Many of their and
supervisors’ comments criticized the fact that, while they may be required to
arrest, prosecutors are not required to prosecute; and resentment that, while
officers responding to domestic violence calls are told to take time and effort
to collect sufficient evidence to enable prosecutors to proceed even without
victim cooperation, such “victimless” prosecutions are, in fact, rare.
One survey respondent wrote that what is needed are, “Prosecutors following
the same guidelines as police in court. Mandatory arrest [must lead to]
mandatory prosecution, or else our time, money and efforts are a total
waste.” Another wrote: “It takes more than six hours to finish a simple DV
report and it only takes 30 minutes for the courts to release all the DVs. A
serious DV will sometimes take more than 12 hours to be done. County
Attorney will just not prosecute.”
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Other respondents noted that the lack of prosecution has unfortunate impacts
on victims and offenders. “Many victims say, ‘I call, but you guys never do
anything.’ Victims may need to be aware that as police officers … we have no
control over prosecution after the arrest.” Another officer wrote: “Most
offenders have been arrested in the past for DV, and are aware of the system’s
failure to follow through with cases. Therefore, there is no fear of conviction.”
Clearly without fear of conviction, the deterrence value of arrest becomes nil.
Differences of opinion between police and prosecutors are not new, and are
not limited to domestic violence cases. And, as noted below, a number of
supervisors in particular cited good relationships with some prosecutors, and
expressed sympathy for those struggling with large caseloads that include
serious felonies as well as domestic violence misdemeanors. Still, supervisors
and line officers alike repeatedly warned that a lack of effective follow-up to
arrest is undercutting Arizona’s pro-arrest policy, leaving too many victims
vulnerable and offenders unpunished, and spreading cynicism among all
parties — notably including themselves.
A female Region 3 detective said:
It’s very frustrating to do as much as we can in law enforcement and then have the
rest of this system not have the funding or the persons to be able to do these things
in a manner that we need to do it as a community … I feel like our officers, we’ve
gotten tools, we’ve gotten an education, but we can’t do it by ourselves.
A male Region 2 detective said:
It’s just a waste of resources if we’re going to [arrest] and the county attorney is
going to say, “Well, we’re not following through with those charges.” Or, a lot of
times this person’s been arrested six times, and “Well, we’re just going to lump it
all together [into] one misdemeanor charge.” Well, what was the whole point of us
doing these six other charges?
The impact on officers was noted by a male supervisor from Region 5:
We have training and we tell the officers this is what you need to do. [That] you
make arrests and you break the cycle of violence and the woman goes to get
counseling and … blah, blah, blah. But the fact of the matter is that officers
make arrests and whether they have evidence or not, the prosecution thing doesn’t
occur … and the officers look at it as, “This [domestic violence] can’t be as big a
problem as everybody’s telling me.”
Still, it’s the police who usually end up having to explain, a male Region 1
detective said:
We get blamed a lot for nothing happening in the courts. We’ll go out [to a scene]
and they’ll say, “Well, I’ve called you guys 15 times and he’s been arrested four of
those times and each of those cases got dropped and you’ve got to explain.”
“… the prosecution
thing doesn’t
occur … and the
officers look at
it as, ‘This [domestic
violence] can’t be
as big a problem
as everybody’s
telling me.’”
— Male Region 5 supervisor
“I feel like our officers,
we’ve gotten tools,
we’ve gotten an
education, but we can’t
do it by ourselves.”
— Female Region 3 detective
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A male Region 1 detective said the offenders also take note:
The worst problem is when it gets to the courts and the judge just says,
“Dismissed.” Or the county attorney doesn’t file it. I mean, what is that
teaching the [suspect]? “OK, he just smacked the shit out of her. She lost a
tooth. The county attorney’s going to turn it down because she’s not showing up
in court. Sweet” … You know, they think they can get away with it.
Some Police and Prosecutors Work Well Together
Respondents also cited positive relationships with and noteworthy work by
prosecutors, especially city personnel who handle misdemeanors. From
these comments, when the arrest/prosecution process works well, everyone
benefits. A female Region 2 detective called city prosecutors “phenomenal.
They are aggressive [and] innovative.”
A male Region 4 supervisor stressed the power of effective prosecution:
When you see the prosecutors, with their tenacity and their desire to make …
the community a better place because they want to work on these things, it keeps
your head in the game, too.
A male Region 1 detective said:
Our city prosecutors are extraordinarily willing to prosecute… The county’s done
a better job too in recent years; [with the county,] I think it’s more a function of
volume, and the sheer numbers of crap they have to handle.
A male Region 5 lieutenant said:
Our prosecutors do a pretty decent job … especially if we have a specific case where,
like, hey, we want to see this one [done]. Do they have the time to do a really good
follow up? No. They’re overburdened like all the other courts and prosecutors are.
A male Region 4 sergeant said:
My personal experience is that we’d rather charge somebody with a misdemeanor
because they get follow up, as opposed to the county attorney’s office [where the
case] gets lost with all the other felonies.
Officers Have Varied Explanations for Prosecutor “Action” (and “Inaction”)
Supervisors occasionally acknowledged that officers don’t always give
prosecutors what they need to proceed effectively. A male Region 1 detective
said:
The prosecutors do the best with what they have, and more often than not, the
cases I’ve seen where there’s [police] frustration – “Why didn’t they do anything
with this?” – Well, they didn’t have anything to work with … You can’t prove
something out of nothing.
“Mandatory arrest
[must lead to]
mandatory prosecution,
or else our time,
money and efforts
are a total waste.”
— Written officer comment
“Our city prosecutors
are extraordinarily
willing to prosecute …
The county’s done a
better job too in
recent years…”
— Male Region 1 detective
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A male captain from Region 4 said:
One of the problems [is that] on a misdemeanor case, the officers are in a hurry,
and they don’t gather the kind of evidence that the prosecutor needs to support a
prosecution in the face of a suddenly uncooperative victim.
Supervisors also said ineffective prosecution can arise from prosecutors’
offices having to cope with inexperienced attorneys and high turnover rates.
A male Region 1 lieutenant said:
Because prosecuting DV is at the bottom rung, an entry-level [prosecutor] starts
there, and you get a lot of turnover. By the time you get this guy educated or this
girl educated, they’ve moved on … and they’re not doing DV any more.
A male Region 1 detective said:
[With] our county attorneys, there’s been such a huge turnover rate that once we
get an attorney on board and kind of educate that attorney … that attorney is
going to go to the dark side, as we say, [and] become a defense attorney.
A female Region 1 detective said:
In my seven years here, I’ve probably seen nine prosecutors go through [the local
court] at least. And every time they step in there, they’re green, so you lose a lot
of cases because going to trial scares a lot of them. And I’ve had them call me,
“Well, we’re going to drop this case.” I said, “No, we’re not.”
Supervisors repeatedly said that prosecutors’ reluctance to pursue domestic
violence cases stems from their desire to keep their conviction percentage
as high as possible. A male lieutenant in Region 5 said:
[State law] says I don’t need victim cooperation to make the arrest. But when it
comes down to prosecuting, prosecutors feel they have to have the victim
cooperation … I wish that prosecutors would take more of a chance, [but]
they’re evaluated on their conviction rate. And so they don’t want to take
anything unless it’s a sure bet.
In response to reluctant prosecutors, a male Region 5 sergeant said, officers
must be persistent:
The only relief we really get from the prosecutors is [when] they get tired of
seeing the same [suspects] over and over and so does the judge. And so … then
they tend to prosecute them harder and harder.
A male Region 1 detective noted that differences between officers and
prosecutors are hardly rare:
It’s frustrating to us, and I know they complain about us, and you know, we
complain about them. That’s just the nature of the business we’re in.
“[State law] says I
don’t need victim
cooperation to make
the arrest. But when
it comes down
to prosecuting,
prosecutors feel
they have to have the
victim cooperation…”
— Male Region 5 lieutenant
“It’s frustrating to us,
and I know they
complain about us, and
you know, we complain
about them. That’s just
the nature of the
business we’re in.”
— Male Region 1 detective
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Officers Want More Discretion in DV Cases
Arizona officers say domestic violence calls are complex, sometimes
dangerous, and often draining assignments that present challenges not
found in other tasks. They also believe they are up to the job. They say they
understand the dynamics of family conflicts and would do an even better job
given more discretion. They firmly reject suggestions for more guidelines and
are split over the value of more domestic violence training.
Officers Report Confidence in Their Ability to Sort Out the Scene
Despite the difficulties presented by domestic violence calls, most officers think
they know when an arrest should be made. That is, they are confident in their
ability to determine if there’s sufficient “probable cause” to believe a crime has
been committed and a certain individual committed it — the legal standard for
arrest. Nearly two-thirds of respondents disagreed that they struggle to sort out
the scenes they encounter. In response to the statement, “I find it’s often hard
to decide whether there is probable cause for arrest in DV cases,” 65.2% of
officers disagreed and only 11.9% agreed (Figure 22). Not surprisingly, officers
with more years of service were even more confident in their judgments than
the others.
Knowing who to arrest was trickier, but still nearly half of officers reported little
difficulty when the statement was, “It’s often hard to know who to arrest in DV
incidents,” with 46.2% disagreeing and 26.6% agreeing (Figure 23).
Nor, officers said, are they easily led astray at
domestic violence scenes by the
demeanor of either suspects or
victims. Researchers have pointed
out that batterers can sometimes
evade arrest by appearing calm,
cooperative and — of course —
innocent to arriving officers. Victims,
meanwhile, may be driven by their
trauma, fear, and anger to be
uncooperative with and even hostile
to police; this may especially be true
if the victim is under the influence of
alcohol or drugs. However, presented
with the statement, “I am less likely
to make a DV arrest if the suspect is
cooperative at the scene,” 73.7% of
Arizona officers disagreed
(Figure 24).
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Officers were more split in describing
their reactions to the behavior of
victims — perhaps reflecting the
ambivalence many officers feel
toward victims. In response to the
statement, “I am more likely to make
an arrest if the victim is cooperative
at the scene,” 42.4% disagreed,
38.2% neither agreed nor disagreed,
and 19.4% agreed (Figure 25).
Officers Say They See the Many
Facets of Domestic Violence
Recent scholarship on domestic
violence has presented incidents as
part of an extended pattern of
behavior by an abuser who’s driven
to dominate and control his or her
intimate partner (Buzawa and
Buzawa 2003: 16). According to the
survey, most Arizona officers appear
to accept this analysis. In response
to the statement, “Most DV calls are
isolated events in otherwise good
relationships,” 68.4% disagreed and
only 6.5% agreed (Figure 26). Non-
white officers were more likely to
agree with the statement.
However, officers have not completely
abandoned the “excessive anger”
explanation in favor of the “power and
control” one. Instead, they seem to
accept both outlooks, because they
say they see both at domestic
violence scenes. In response to the
statement “Most DV incidents occur because of offenders’ anger-control
problems,” 59.6% agreed and only 12.7% disagreed (Figure 27).
And in response to the statement, “Most DV incidents stem from abusers’
need for power and control over victims;” a similar percentage — 55.3% —
agreed and 6.5% disagreed (Figure 28). Female officers were more likely to
agree with the statement, as were non-white officers.
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Some researchers may see these explanations as different, making it seem
impossible that “most” domestic violence incidents could be traced to two
roots. But many Arizona officers do not appear to see them as incompatible;
indeed, 38.6% agreed with both statements.
The Call for More Officer Discretion
Regardless of the sources of domestic violence, it’s clear that officers believe
that successfully dealing with it requires them to make difficult decisions in
complex, fast-moving circumstances. This may be one reason why nearly half —
48.4% — agreed with the statement “I need more freedom in deciding how to
handle situations at DV calls,” and only 21.6% disagreed (Figure 29). Support
for this was stronger among male officers, those in urban areas, and those
who had responded to larger numbers of calls in the past year (150+).
In keeping with that view, an overwhelming majority of officers rejected
stricter guidelines. Less than 3% of respondents agreed that they needed,
“…stricter guidelines from supervisors on how to deal with DV calls (Figure
30). Indeed, 89.8% of those who said they did not want more freedom also
said they did not want stricter guidelines.
Opposition to stricter guidelines was again stronger among men, those in
urban areas, and those who had responded to larger numbers of calls in the
last year (150+). It was also stronger among newer officers — those with less
than 3.5 years in law enforcement.
The issue of discretion elicited more than 50 written comments. One officer
wrote, “I understand the spirit of the law, but many times by making an arrest
we prevent that person/family to ever call 911 again for fear of someone
being arrested for minor things.” Another wrote, “[What would help] is more
leniency in the law/policy on how officers must handle DV calls. An arrest
doesn’t always solve the problem, especially when prosecutors do not
prosecute suspects when victims do not want to cooperate.”
A third officer asked for: A bit more latitude in the ability to make an arrest.
For example, sometimes we respond to a DV situation in which, ‘by law,’ we
would be required to make an arrest. Sometimes we do that (make the
arrest) only because we are required to – not necessarily because we think
that would be the best solution. If officers felt more comfortable to make
decisions about resolutions without fear of possible liability – perhaps more
DVs would be quickly and efficiently resolved.
Only one respondent wrote against officer discretion: “85% of DV murder
victims are killed after leaving their partner; there should not be any discretion
in making decisions on making arrests … Mandatory arrest works well.”
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Supervisors were in general less supportive of giving first responders more
discretion. A lieutenant in Region 5 saw lack of discretion as a useful tool for
the officer in the field:
In a way, it’s also a bit easier for the officer, because it does take the discretion
away from them, in the sense that … the person is no longer directly angry at
the officer, there’s like, “Look, you know what, I don’t have a choice. I’m really
sorry.” And it gives us a way to diffuse the situation, so that helps.
And a sergeant in Region 5 noted that current rules made a supervisor’s job
easier:
But the arrest law, it’s a clear-cut thing, so if the officer calls me and says “This
happened.” [I say] “Well then, you shall go ahead and arrest that party based
on the information you have given me.” And so it makes it kind of easy for me as
a supervisor, too, to deal with DVs.
Some supervisors, however, did support greater officer discretion. A male
detective in Region 2, for example, remarked on the value of experience in
helping officers “read” the situation:
And I think we need that [discretion] … because I don’t think you have
anything better in the field than a patrol officer that’s been on the force for
awhile … that knows what he’s looking at and has a good feel for what he sees.
In keeping with some of the written responses, a female supervisor in Region
2 summarized the dilemma officers can face at domestic violence scenes:
… if there’s two aggressors or if there’s situations that are very minor that you
think, okay, somebody lost their temper here a little bit, a mistake was made, poor
judgment was used, … do we really need to take it to [the arrest] level? Well, the
law says we do. And so, I think that’s where some of the frustration comes in,
because [officers] really don’t feel taking this individual to jail is going to resolve
anything. Somebody had too much to drink, somebody lost their temper, somebody
took some frustration out, and somebody got hurt because of it. It wasn’t their
intent. So, you know, when officers go there, they’re looking at intent, they’re
looking at the victims involved, they’re looking at the whole scenario. But the way
the statute is written, sometimes they don’t have a choice, even if it’s a minor
infraction. Technically, if it’s domestic violence, then they have to [arrest].
More Domestic Violence Training Is Not a Very Attractive Possibility
Many of the issues discussed in this study deal with topics covered in
domestic violence training for Arizona officers, particularly the requirements
of Arizona law and the understanding of “victimology.” Yet exactly how much
training officers receive differs across the state. Wide variations in the
number of trainings attended, as reported by survey respondents, and in the
time reported since their last training surface in these data. Some of this
variation is likely explained by differences among respondents as to what
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they counted as “training.” The only mandatory training is 14 hours — out of
585 hours — at the police academy, before any direct experience in the field.
Opinions were mixed among survey respondents about the value of further
domestic violence training. In response to the statement, “More training
would help me sort out what happens at DV scenes,” 35.4% agreed, but
almost as many (34.9%) disagreed (Figure 31). Among those significantly
more likely to agree were female officers, those outside of major urban
areas, those who had been on fewer domestic violence calls in the last year,
and those with less than 3.5 years or more than 12 years in law
enforcement. There was no relationship between agreement with this
statement and the number of domestic violence trainings received in Arizona
or time since the last training.
Several supervisors who supported training saw its main utility in teaching
officers about the law, arrest procedures, and evidence gathering, rather
than about the nature of domestic violence. For instance, a male supervisor
in Region 4 said:
I think every one of us that’s been a cop for more than about 20 minutes has
probably seen a woman that’s been abused, a man that’s been abused, a child
that’s been abused – you don’t need to show us that again. … We don’t need
to have them tell us their sad story because we’ve seen it. Tell us why the law is
the way it is, help us understand what it truly means. … When it says, if this is
the case, you must do this …
A male lieutenant in Region 5 said:
[Useful training would include] something about safety at DVs, making an arrest,
how to elicit information from a victim while you are there doing the investigation.
Interrogation techniques, and things like that and interpersonal skills.
But further statistical analysis of survey responses suggests that more training
on understanding the ins and outs of domestic violence might also show
results. As would be expected, the longer officers reported working in law
enforcement, the more domestic violence training sessions they were likely to
have attended. Still, there were plenty of exceptions, as Table 8 shows.
The association between the number of sessions and certain survey
statements was analyzed while controlling for years in law enforcement. The
results showed that — regardless of years in service — the more training
sessions respondents reported attending, the more likely they were to agree
with the statement: “I think DV offenders should be arrested even when
victims don’t want it,” which arguably is the central tenet of the current pro-
arrest approach to domestic violence and still the approach favored most by
advocates and domestic violence experts. Officers with more training
experience also were less likely to agree with statements which most
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• 31 •
Levels of Agreement with,
“More training would help me sort out
what happens at DV scenes.” (n=774)
Source: Morrison Institute for Public Policy, Arizona
State University, 2005.
“… I don’t think you
have anything better in
the field than a patrol
officer that’s been on
the force for awhile…”
— Male Region 2 detective
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researchers now say reflect an
erroneous approach, including:
• Too many DV calls are for only
verbal family arguments.
• Police should arrest in DV cases
only when there is clear evidence
of injury.
• DV is best handled as a private
matter, rather than by the police.
• Many DV victims could easily
leave their relationships, but
don’t.
• Most victims are safer as soon as
they leave an abusive
relationship.
These results suggest that — despite most officers’ lukewarm support for
training and their confidence in their own knowledge and abilities — repeat
training does have a positive effect on certain key understandings of
domestic violence issues. However, given that much training is voluntary and
that these data do not tell us what type of training was involved, it could be
that those who develop the better understanding of domestic violence are
more likely to go on training courses or be more interested in domestic
violence. Training may be a consequence of understanding or interest, not a
cause of it.
Table 8: Cross-tabulation of Domestic Violence Training Sessions Reported by
Years in Law Enforcement (N=715)
Years in Law Enforcement
DV Training Sessions
3.5 Years
and Less
3.6 - 6.5
Years
6.6 - 12
Years
More than
12 Years Total
0-1 Sessions
Count 99 58 51 22 230
% 40.0% 25.2% 22.2% 9.6% 100.0%
2-3 Sessions
Count 65 59 72 53 249
% 26.1% 23.7% 28.9% 21.3% 100.0%
4 or More Sessions
Count 28 40 75 93 236
% 11.9% 16.9% 31.8% 39.4% 100.0%
Total
Count 192 157 198 168 715
% 26.9% 22.0% 27.7% 23.5% 100.0%
Source: Morrison Institute for Public Policy, Arizona State University, 2005.
In sum, Arizona officers’ frustration with domestic violence comes from many sources. They
include:
• restrictions that current law and policy place on officers’ discretion
• the high number of repeat calls
• the many calls that end up being “verbal only” disputes
• the frequency with which victims refuse to prosecute or leave an abusive relationship
• the perceived lack of effective follow-up by prosecutors and judges
• the perceived lack of emergency support for victims from social service agencies.a
It would be difficult to overestimate how potent and universal these concerns are among Arizona law
enforcement officers. Even the best-intentioned of them seem to be struggling against cynicism and
a draining sense of futility.
a. In 2003, 9,473 women and children received services in Arizona’s domestic violence shelters; only one-third of those who requested
shelter  were able to be accommodated, according to the Arizona Department of Economic Security.
Officers Voice Frustration with  Many Domestic Violence Issues
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Conclusions and Next Steps
Arizona law enforcement officers take domestic violence seriously, even if they
don’t always appreciate its nuances. They see the far-reaching effects of
domestic violence and are trying to do what is asked of them in the face of a
high-volume, high-stress, high-frustration issue that sometimes offends their
personal sense of right and wrong. Officers welcomed the opportunity to tell
those outside law enforcement what they think. They did not hold back.
Their dedication, frustration, isolation, indignation, resignation, and
misperceptions jump off the page. Their words and responses reveal the
tension between the concrete nature of police work and the psychological
nature of domestic violence.
Their participation in this study provides important input into developing
policies that can do more to reduce and prevent domestic violence. Their
opinions showed:
Agreement on a Law Enforcement Role in a Serious Issue
• The vast majority of Arizona officers consider domestic violence to
be a serious, underreported problem that generates other crime
and violence and contributes to a variety of costly issues for
families, communities, and employers — all residents in fact.
No “Lockstep” Opinion about Domestic Violence
• The assumption that police officers will almost always hold the
same opinions about issues is unfounded. Officers do not think or
act in lockstep, but draw diverse meanings and conclusions from
their common experience.
Policy Change Brought Community Change
• Nearly all officers accept the view of domestic violence as a “real
crime” that warrants police intervention. Many related efforts over
the past 20 years have changed how most officers think and work.
Arrest Alone Has Disappointed as a Deterrent
• Much remains to be done beyond a pro-arrest policy. Across the
state, officers do not agree that Arizona’s pro-arrest policy, on its
own, can be effective in reducing domestic violence.
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Handling Victims is a Conundrum
• Victims’ actions and attitudes often confound officers who
sympathize with their plight yet question why victims so often
remain in abusive relationships and fail to follow through with
prosecution of abusers.
An Unfulfilled Promise as yet in Prosecution
• Officers recognize the burdens faced by overworked prosecutors,
yet voice frustration with what they perceive to be a lack of follow
up. Officers feel this lessens the impact of arrest, discourages
victims, emboldens batterers, and spreads cynicism among
officers themselves.
Officers Are Looking for More Choices at the Scene
• Most officers want more discretion and fewer guidelines from
supervisors about how to handle domestic violence calls.
Increase and Improve Training for Officers
• Officers are split over whether more training is needed, but
evidence suggests that additional training specifically geared to the
outlooks and realities of law enforcment officers is warranted,
particularly those with relatively short service in law enforcment.
Stopping the Downward Spiral
• Officers’ frustration reflects a swamped criminal justice system
caught in a downward spiral of expectation, action, and outcome.
Based on their experience with too many uncooperative victims and
arrests that are not followed by timely prosecution, many officers
seem to end up resigned to the conclusion that intervening at a
domestic violence scene will at best protect the victim for that one
night. Over time, this pessimism may erode officers’ appreciation of
victims’ needs, rendering officers less sympathetic and less
meticulous in gathering the evidence necessary for effective
prosecution. As a consequence, prosecutors may reject cases they
say are ill-prepared; victims lose faith in the system, and some stop
calling 911; and offenders learn there may be no consequences for
their actions.
Officers stress the devastating effects of domestic violence on families and
neighborhoods. They recognize that it is a problem that makes other
community issues worse. And they want to do their part. But officers also feel
caught between a number of conflicting forces and isolated in their efforts.
As a result, they fear they may not be doing the best for victims or ensuring
that offenders are held accountable.
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Domestic violence is, of course, far from a new problem. In Arizona, many
public officials, law enforcement officers, advocates, and others have been
working for years to enhance victim safety and offender accountability, and
they continue to pursue vitally important projects in this area. Layers of
Meaning’s findings confirm the significance of these efforts, and suggest
some useful next steps in furthering the state’s campaign to prevent and
reduce domestic violence:
• Promote Domestic Violence Training for Officers.
The data in this study suggest that, perhaps surprisingly, newer officers
are most in need of training, especially in understanding the
psychological dynamics that drive victim attitudes and behavior. They —
as well as older officers — could also benefit from a deeper
appreciation of the frequently long-term demands of domestic violence
enforcement — that repeat calls are commonplace, and should be
accepted as an opportunity to establish a better rapport with the victim
and a stronger case against the abuser. The data also suggest that
officers could use further training in effective problem-solving at
domestic violence scenes, which includes securing the scene, dealing
with the offender (present or not), attending to the victim and
witnesses, and gathering evidence. Such training could help raise
officers’ expectations of their role beyond just keeping the victim safe
for one more night.
Domestic violence training in Arizona comes in many forms, from the
full curriculum developed by AZPOST to squad room briefings by
supervisors and detectives. But, as previous research has noted, no
systematic compilation of the various training approaches nor
evaluation of their efficacy has been made. There is a need to know
what training works, for which officers, at which points in their service.
• Strengthen Community Efforts to Prevent Domestic Violence.
Efforts to combat domestic violence must start well before a 911 call.
Everyone in Arizona has a stake in preventing and reducing domestic
violence because of its connections to other crime, violence, and social
dysfunction. Many communities already are making strong efforts in
such areas as education, shelters, counseling, and other victim
services. But this study suggests that more should be done to
emphasize the links between the crime of domestic violence and its
broader social antecedents and consequences; the concern is that too
many Arizonans might now believe that calling 911 is a sufficient
response to domestic violence, while the majority of officers in Layers
of Meaning say that it is only one necessary element to successfully
combating this pervasive social ill.
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•
Communities throughout Arizona are busy pursuing varying approaches
to a more efficient criminal justice response, including special domestic
violence courts, family advocacy centers and victim-assistance staff.
These are promising initiatives, but have yet to be examined to determine
how well they work or even how best their performance can be measured.
Arizona’s pro-arrest laws and policies have primarily altered the operation
of law enforcement — only one component of the state’s criminal justice
system. To be truly effective, the pro-arrest approach would ideally be
followed by the appropriate statewide “pro-prosecution” initiative and by
suitable sentencing and community supervision of offenders.  Existing
groups, including the Committee on the Impact of Domestic Violence and
the Courts (CIDVC), are making valuable contributions to this end. A
further key element would be realigning the system to make it more
supportive of victims, in order to keep them involved in prosecution.
• Map Key Domestic Violence Decision Points.
Domestic violence cases in Arizona must pass through numerous key
decision points (arrest, detective follow up, submission for prosecution,
etc.) across several separate bureaucracies. This might contribute to the
fact that the state still lacks a reliable means of tracking cases along
these points, from 911 call to final disposition. Creating a case-tracking
mechanism — which ideally could evolve into a case-management system
— would enable policy makers to accurately assess the magnitude and
nature of Arizona’s domestic violence problem, pinpoint bottlenecks in
the criminal justice system, and ensure greater overall  system
accountability.
• Review How Prosecution Functions as Part of the Overall System.
Now that the viewpoints of Arizona’s domestic violence victims and law
enforcement officers have been examined, it is important to consider the
perspective of prosecutors. The data in Layers of Meaning suggest that
Arizona’s pro-arrest approach has shifted discretion in domestic violence
enforcement from law enforcement officers to prosecutors. At the least,
officers and prosecutors must establish more reliable means of sharing
information, resources, and strategies in domestic violence enforcement.
At best, prosecutors and the courts should consider upgrading their
treatment of even misdemeanor domestic violence — the typical violation
— as a serious offense that generates other crime and otherwise has
extensive negative impacts on communities. This is another area in
which approaches currently being tried by police and prosecutors, and
courts in various Arizona communities might offer examples of best
practices.
Strengthen Arizona’s Criminal Justice Response to Domestic Violence.
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The findings in this study likely confirm what many in law enforcement and
domestic violence work already know. For others, however, the results open a
window on an issue that, though quite widespread, is often hidden and
frequently perceived as someone else’s problem. For all Arizonans — public
institutions, private employers, neighborhood groups, schools, faith-based
organizations — these findings should be a wake up call: Domestic violence
is everyone’s problem. Arizona’s police officers and sheriff’s deputies form
the state’s front line, but it is an assignment impossible to do alone. By
strengthening prevention efforts, enhancing training, and helping the
criminal justice system function better as a system, Arizonans can reduce
debilitating levels of frustration and ensure that “first responder” does not
mean “only responder.”
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Appendix
Methodology
One of the main aims of this study was to gather information from Arizona’s
police officers both quantitatively, through a widely distributed opinion
survey, and qualitatively, by individual in-depth interviews with key
informants. Another goal was to ensure that answers were candid and
represented a broad array of experience and opinion.
Advice from experts in criminal justice research, local police supervisors, and
members of Morrison Institute’s advisory group warned of the difficulties of
achieving these goals without personal contact with each targeted police
department, on-site administration of the survey, and a visit to each
interviewee at his or her office. In addition, a random sample survey of
officers in Arizona was ruled out because of logistical difficulties and the
expectation that surveying via mail would produce a low response rate.
The study focused on officers in Arizona’s 87 local general-purpose law-
enforcement agencies — police departments and sheriff’s offices — and did
not include Native American tribal police, special agencies (those serving
universities, state agencies, railroads, etc.), the statewide Arizona
Department of Public Safety (DPS), or several one- or two-person operations
in small towns (marshals and constables). Most were excluded because their
officers seldom deal with domestic violence calls; Native American officers
were omitted because it was feared that tribes’ varying laws and policies
would unduly complicate efforts to blend their data with that from the rest of
the state. This omission in no way discounts the problem of domestic
violence on reservations; indeed, indications from current research are that
domestic violence among Native Americans in Arizona is clearly deserving of
separate study (National Indian Justice Center. 1993; Murphy 1998).
A pilot survey was administered and an interview conducted with a police
supervisor in March 2005, at an agency in southern Arizona, to test survey
administration, questionnaire wording, and the quality of results. A pilot
interview was also conducted in northern Arizona. The survey instrument was
revised slightly, vetted by domestic violence detectives, and final interview
questions developed in April and May 2005. A target of 750 completed
surveys and 30 interviews was agreed to by the study’s advisory panel,
based on the distribution of frontline officers across regions and agency size,
and a protocol for administration was developed.
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An analysis of AZPOST data showed that 80% of potential target officers
worked for Maricopa or Pima County located police agencies. In order to have
a broader representation of the state, 5 study regions were targeted, and
police agencies contacted in each region to maximize a geographically
disbursed distribution. The result was a survey response comprising 66%
percent from Maricopa or Pima county police agencies and 38% from the
balance of the state (see Table 4). It was decided to visit as many and varied
police agencies in the state as possible in the time available. The current
study gathered data from 31 law enforcement agencies; 8 in Region 1, 4 in
Region 2; 7 in Region 3; 5 in region 4; and 7 in Region 5. A listing of all law
enforcement officers in Arizona was obtained from AZPOST to indicate the
work locations of potential target agencies and the size of the agencies. An
attempt was made to include not only agencies throughout the state but also
a mix of large and small agencies and police departments and county
sheriff’s offices. The largest police agency in each region was included.
All 31 agencies contacted agreed to take part in the study. Each agency
chosen was visited by researchers, who provided instructions, questionnaires
and return-mail envelopes to agency administrators. The administrators then
distributed the questionnaires — each in its own sealable envelope — and
collected the responses. At 13 agencies — including all of the state’s largest
— most or all questionnaires were administered directly to officers by
researchers. All 31 interviews were in-person, one-on-one sessions.
Given this was not a random sample survey, the quantitative data analysis
presented uses simple descriptive and exploratory statistical techniques. The
tests used to report statistical significance are non-parametric and,
therefore, do not make assumptions about the underlying population from
which the sample was constructed. The disadvantage of this approach is
that results tend to be less sensitive than parametric equivalents and may
miss some differences between groups. However, 49 of 256 items tested
were significant using the Mann-Whitney test for differences between two
independent groups (males and females, for example) and the Kruskal-Wallis
test for three or more groups (the five study regions, for example), and the 32
continuous variables of statements about domestic violence. These tests are
the non-parametric equivalent of independent-samples t-test (Mann-Whitney)
and one-way between-groups ANOVA (Kruskal-Wallis).
Transcribed interview data were coded using QSR-N6 software for qualitative
data analysis. The coding scheme was organized into 6 major areas
corresponding to the issues focused on in the survey instrument: arrest
process and decision; attitude to victims; comments about offenders; the
police role in domestic violence, the criminal justice system response; and
other issues. Each area was sub-coded; for example, the police role in
LAYERS OF MEANING:
D O M E S T I C  V I O L E N C E  A N D  L A W  E N F O R C E M E N T  A T T I T U D E S  I N  A R I Z O N A
57Morrison Institute for Public Policy
domestic violence area was sub-coded into: attitude to victims, danger of DV,
relationships to DV organizations, general view of DV cases, dedicated DV
staff, agency protocols, workload, discretion, experience with DV, police
personalities, rural issues, emotional response to DV, counseling role, private
vs. police role in DV, evidence gathering, and frustration. In total, nearly 100
sub-codes were created. Each transcribed interview was coded for as many
codes as applied. The codes were used to analyze content and to produce
the extracts included above. The extracts come directly from the transcribed
interviews with only small changes and omissions made to wording for the
sake of readability.
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Please turn page over and complete the items on the other side ?
  
Law Enforcement Survey on Domestic Violence Incidents
Please take a few moments to complete the items below. All answers and comments are completely confidential. No individuals
or departments will be identified in reports. Your opinion counts.
How many years in total have you worked in law enforcement? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Approximately how many domestic violence training sessions have you attended in Arizona? . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Approximately how long ago was your last training on domestic violence issues? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
years months
Have you ever responded to a domestic violence (DV) call? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F Yes F No
Approximately how many DV calls have you responded to in the last year? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Does your job involve any special domestic violence duties? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F Yes F No
If Yes, please specify:
Based on your experience and opinion, please check your level of agreement with each of the following statements:
Strongly
Agree
Agree Neither Agree
Nor Disagree
Disagree Strongly
Disagree
I am more likely to be injured during a DV call than in a violence call involving strangers. G G G G G
Too many DV calls are for only verbal family arguments. G G G G G
I need more freedom in deciding how to handle situations at DV calls. G G G G G
It’s often best to arrest both parties in DV calls. G G G G G
Substance abuse by the victim is a primary cause of DV. G G G G G
Arresting someone at a DV call seldom helps reduce future DV incidents. G G G G G
Police should arrest in DV cases only when there is clear evidence of injury. G G G G G
DV calls take too much of officers’ time and effort. G G G G G
DV is best handled as a private matter, rather than by the police. G G G G G
In my experience, prosecutors usually follow up effectively on DV arrests. G G G G G
DV victims are often as responsible for the incident as the person arrested. G G G G G
It’s often hard to know who to arrest in DV incidents. G G G G G
I am less likely to make a DV arrest if the suspect is cooperative at the scene. G G G G G
An arrest policy is the best approach to DV calls. G G G G G
Many DV victims could easily leave their relationships, but don’t. G G G G G
Most DV incidents occur because of offenders’ anger-control problems. G G G G G
•
Survey Instrument
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Strongly
Agree
Agree Neither Agree
Nor Disagree
Disagree Strongly
Disagree
A major problem with DV is that there are so many repeat cases. G G G G G
Substance abuse by the suspect is a primary cause of DV. G G G G G
Most DV calls are isolated events in otherwise good relationships. G G G G G
I need stricter guidelines from supervisors on how to deal with DV calls. G G G G G
I am more likely to make DV arrests when children are witnesses. G G G G G
There should be a limit on how many times I respond to DV calls from the same victim at
the same address.
G G G G G
I think DV offenders should be arrested even when the victims don’t want it. G G G G G
More training would help me sort out what happens at DV scenes. G G G G G
I find it’s often hard to decide whether there is probable cause for arrest in DV cases. G G G G G
DV victims often exaggerate the amount of violence involved. G G G G G
Most DV incidents stem from abusers’ need for power and control over victims. G G G G G
Mental health problems are a major contributor to DV incidents. G G G G G
Most DV victims are receptive to interventions by law enforcement. G G G G G
I am more likely to make an arrest if the victim is cooperative at the scene. G G G G G
Most victims are safer as soon as they leave an abusive relationship. G G G G G
DV is a significant problem in the community I serve. G G G G G
What would help you in dealing with domestic violence calls?
Please add any other comments or thoughts about your experience with domestic violence calls.
Does your agency have a domestic violence unit? F Yes       F No       F Don’t know
Finally, for statistical purposes, please indicate the following:
Agency:  Rank:
Gender F Male   F Female Age           Race/Ethnicity F White   F African-American   F Hispanic   F Asian   F Native American
F Other
For further information about this survey, please contact Richard Toon, Morrison Institute for Public Policy, Arizona State
University, 480?965?4525 or richard.toon@asu.edu. Morrison Institute for Public Policy is an independent, nonpartisan public
policy research unit in the School of Public Affairs, College of Public Programs.
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Table 9: Summary of Survey Responses by 5-point Scale
Statement
Strongly
Agree Agree
Neither Agree
Nor Disagree Disagree
Strongly
Disagree Total
I am more likely to be injured during a DV call than in a violence call
involving strangers.
Count 172 358 205 35 2 772
% 22.3% 46.4% 26.6% 4.5% 0.3% 100.0%
Too many DV calls are for only verbal family arguments.
Count 165 350 172 82 3 772
% 21.4% 45.3% 22.3% 10.6% 0.4% 100.0%
I need more freedom in deciding how to handle situations at DV calls.
Count 148 226 232 147 20 773
% 19.1% 29.2% 30.0% 19.0% 2.6% 100.0%
It's often best to arrest both parties in DV calls.
Count 18 72 267 347 71 775
% 2.3% 9.3% 34.5% 44.8% 9.2% 100.0%
Substance abuse by the victim is a primary cause of DV.
Count 74 173 237 232 52 768
% 9.6% 22.5% 30.9% 30.2% 6.8% 100.0%
Arresting someone at a DV call seldom helps reduce future DV incidents.
Count 137 311 142 160 21 771
% 17.8% 40.3% 18.4% 20.8% 2.7% 100.0%
Police should arrest in DV cases only when there is clear evidence of
injury.
Count 101 221 133 269 50 774
% 13.0% 28.6% 17.2% 34.8% 6.5% 100.0%
DV calls take too much of officers' time and effort.
Count 81 149 217 263 65 775
% 10.5% 19.2% 28.0% 33.9% 8.4% 100.0%
DV is best handled as a private matter, rather than by the police.
Count 14 33 126 393 208 774
% 1.8% 4.3% 16.3% 50.8% 26.9% 100.0%
In my experience, prosecutors usually follow up effectively on DV arrests.
Count 14 97 240 283 136 770
% 1.8% 12.6% 31.2% 36.8% 17.7% 100.0%
DV victims are often as responsible for the incident as the person
arrested.
Count 51 229 271 191 30 772
% 6.6% 29.7% 35.1% 24.7% 3.9% 100.0%
It's often hard to know who to arrest in DV incidents.
Count 16 189 210 323 33 771
% 2.1% 24.5% 27.2% 41.9% 4.3% 100.0%
I am less likely to make a DV arrest if the suspect is cooperative at the
scene.
Count 9 44 149 468 98 768
% 1.2% 5.7% 19.4% 60.9% 12.8% 100.0%
An arrest policy is the best approach to DV calls.
Count 37 208 247 224 60 776
% 4.8% 26.8% 31.8% 28.9% 7.7% 100.0%
Many DV victims could easily leave their relationships, but don't.
Count 230 326 113 86 19 774
% 29.7% 42.1% 14.6% 11.1% 2.5% 100.0%
Most DV incidents occur because of offenders' anger-control problems.
Count 110 349 213 90 8 770
% 14.3% 45.3% 27.7% 11.7% 1.0% 100.0%
A major problem with DV is that there are so many repeat cases.
Count 224 452 73 22 3 774
% 28.9% 58.4% 9.4% 2.8% 0.4% 100.0%
Substance abuse by the suspect is a primary cause of DV.
Count 114 334 232 81 8 769
% 14.8% 43.4% 30.2% 10.5% 1.0% 100.0%
Most DV calls are isolated events in otherwise good relationships.
Count 4 46 193 421 105 769
% 0.5% 6.0% 25.1% 54.7% 13.7% 100.0%
I need stricter guidelines from supervisors on how to deal with DV calls.
Count 4 12 132 420 202 770
% 0.5% 1.6% 17.1% 54.5% 26.2% 100.0%
I am more likely to make DV arrests when children are witnesses.
Count 23 161 325 231 28 768
% 3.0% 21.0% 42.3% 30.1% 3.6% 100.0%
There should be a limit on how many times I respond to DV calls from
the same victim at the same address.
Count 62 111 138 336 126 773
% 8.0% 14.4% 17.9% 43.5% 16.3% 100.0%
I think DV offenders should be arrested even when victims don't want it.
Count 185 372 94 78 46 775
% 23.9% 48.0% 12.1% 10.1% 5.9% 100.0%
More training would help me sort out what happens at DV scenes.
Count 44 230 230 208 62 774
% 5.7% 29.7% 29.7% 26.9% 8.0% 100.0%
I find it's often hard to decide whether there is probable cause for arrest
in DV cases.
Count 8 84 177 416 89 774
% 1.0% 10.9% 22.9% 53.7% 11.5% 100.0%
DV victims often exaggerate the amount of violence involved.
Count 51 263 267 181 13 775
% 6.6% 33.9% 34.5% 23.4% 1.7% 100.0%
Most DV incidents stem from abusers' need for power and control over
victims.
Count 90 336 295 47 3 771
% 11.7% 43.6% 38.3% 6.1% 0.4% 100.0%
Mental health problems are a major contributor to DV incidents.
Count 11 138 402 207 14 772
% 1.4% 17.9% 52.1% 26.8% 1.8% 100.0%
Most DV victims are receptive to interventions by law enforcement.
Count 7 146 230 323 64 770
% 0.9% 19.0% 29.9% 41.9% 8.3% 100.0%
I am more likely to make an arrest if the victim is cooperative at the
scene.
Count 13 136 293 283 42 767
% 1.7% 17.7% 38.2% 36.9% 5.5% 100.0%
Most victims are safer as soon as they leave an abusive relationship.
Count 130 354 162 99 25 770
% 16.9% 46.0% 21.0% 12.9% 3.2% 100.0%
DV is a significant problem in the community I serve.
Count 245 376 111 35 5 772
% 31.7% 48.7% 14.4% 4.5% 0.6% 100.0%
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Interview Questions (Asked of detectives and supervisors in one-on-one, in-person interviews)
? Does your agency have personnel dedicated solely or specifically to DV
work (e.g., detectives)? If so, how many?
? Does your agency have a training officer who trains in DV?
? Does your agency fund or otherwise provide DV training past the initial
field training stage?
? Does your agency have a written policy or protocols concerning DV?
? Do your officers routinely use cameras and/or tape recorders at DV
scenes?
? Do you think they are useful?
? Does your agency participate in a local interagency team addressing DV
issues?
? Where would you rank DV among the law-enforcement problems facing
this community, and among the demands on your agency’s time and
resources?
? How frequent are DV calls compared to all your violence calls?
? Do you have any sense of whether DV calls are increasing, decreasing
or remaining the same?
? What proportion of DV calls are repeat calls?
? How dangerous are DV calls for your officers compared to all calls or all
violence calls? Of DV calls, what proportion end up being verbal
disputes without evidence of violence or damage?
? What proportion of DV calls involve conflicts among siblings, in-laws
and parents and children – not between adult spouses or partners?
? Thinking for a moment of your own experience, has police handling of
DV changed during your career? If so, how?
? Could you describe in general how you think your officers feel about DV
calls?
? How well do you think your agency is handling DV workload in your
jurisdiction?
? What do you think of “pro-arrest” policies in DV cases?
? Do you think dual arrest is often a good solution?
? One study showed that women make up a high percentage of DV
arrestees in Arizona. Is that the case for your agency?
? Do you think arresting somebody does any good in the long term?
Reduce repeat visits? Reduce future violence?
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? How would you respond to concerns that not enough DV arrests are
being made?
? Are local prosecutors able to follow up on DV arrests as effectively as
you would like? Are their plea practices acceptable to you?
? Are local judges able to follow up on DV arrests as effectively as you
would like?
? Do local DV organizations, advocates and shelters contribute effectively
to handling the DV problem? How or why not?
? How would you describe your agency’s relationship with local DV
organizations?
? Do Orders of Protection do any good?
? What 2 things would most help your agency improve its DV
performance?
? What changes in training would most help your agency?
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